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What Explains the German Labor Market 
Miracle in the Great Recession?
ABSTRACT    Germany experienced an even deeper fall in GDP in the Great 
Recession than the United States, with little employment loss. Employers’ 
reticence to hire in the preceding expansion, associated in part with a lack of 
confidence it would last, contributed to an employment shortfall equivalent 
to 40 percent of the missing employment decline in the recession. Another 
20 percent may be explained by wage moderation. A third important element was 
the widespread adoption of working time accounts, which permit employers to 
avoid overtime pay if hours per worker average to standard hours over a window 
of time. We find that this provided disincentives for employers to lay off workers 
in the downturn. Although the overall cuts in hours per worker were consistent 
with the severity of the Great Recession, reduction of working time account 
balances substituted for traditional government-sponsored short-time work.
like the United States, Germany recently experienced a recession of a  magnitude not seen since the Great Depression. German GDP fell 
6.6 percent from its peak in 2008Q1, exceeding the 4.1 percent peak-
to-trough decline in the United States from 2007Q4 (figure 1, top left). 
Yet the labor market experiences of the two countries could hardly have 
been more different. As the top right panel of figure 1 shows, the U.S. 
unemployment rate soared from 4.5 percent in the first quarter of 2007 to a 
high of 10.0 percent by the end of 2009, while the German unemployment 
rate actually declined over the period, only briefly rising from 7.4 percent to 
7.9 percent in late 2008 and early 2009. The contrast is mirrored in the path of 
employment (figure 1, bottom left): while U.S. employment fell 5.6 percent, 
German employment fell a mere 0.5 percent before resuming an upward 
path. Germany’s 3.4 percent reduction in person-hours worked was larger 
Copyright 2011, The Brookings Institution
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than its decline in employment, yet still much smaller than the 7.6 percent 
fall in the United States (figure 1, bottom right). These key changes and the 
peak and trough quarters in each country are summarized in table 1.
The German and U.S. labor market experiences during this period 
are almost polar opposites in the international context. Among pre-1990 
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), only Spain and Ireland had larger percentage reductions in 
employment in 2008–09 than the United States, and only Australia, which 
experienced no recession, fared better than Germany in terms of employ-
ment (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010). Figure 1 also plots outcomes 
for the United Kingdom, a more representative country: its GDP decline 
was similar to that of the United States, but its recovery has been slower, 
and its increase in unemployment and reduction in employment lie in 
between the trajectories of the United States and Germany.
The German experience in 2008–09 contrasts not merely with that of 
the United States, but also with previous German recessions, as figure 2 
illustrates. In terms of the output decline (top panel), the 2008–09 recession 
Figure 1. the Great recession in Germany, the united States, and the united Kingdom, 
2007–10a
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Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, German Federal Statisti-
cal Office, and Bart Hobijn, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
a. Data are quarterly and seasonally adjusted.
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Table 1. changes in Output and the labor market in the Great recession, 
united States and Germanya
Percent except where noted otherwise
	 United	States	 Germany
Measure	 Peak	 Trough	 Change	 Peak	 Trough	 Change
Real GDP 2007Q4 2009Q2 -4.1 2008Q1 2009Q1 -6.6
Unemployment 2007Q1 2009Q4 5.5 2008Q4 2009Q2 0.5 
  rateb
Employment 2008Q1 2009Q4 -5.6 2008Q4 2009Q2 -0.5
Person-hours 2007Q4 2009Q4 -7.6 2008Q2 2009Q2 -3.4
  worked
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, German Federal Statistical 
Office, and Bart Hobijn, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
a. Data used in the calculations are seasonally adjusted.
b. In percentage points.
was unusually severe. By comparison, GDP declined by only 2.4 percent 
from peak to trough in the 1973–75 recession, little more than a third of 
the 2008–09 decline; the peak-to-trough declines in the other three reces-
sions depicted were even smaller. The virtual absence of any employment 
decline in 2008–09 is also unprecedented among recent recessions, as the 
middle panel shows. In the 1973–75 recession, employment fell 4.3 per-
cent from its peak to its trough 11 quarters later. The 2008–09 decline in 
person-hours seems less remarkable (bottom panel): person-hours fell 
rapidly, retracing the early path of the 1973–75 decline. Considering the 
much greater decline in GDP in the Great Recession, however, the similar-
ity of the declines in person-hours is a surprise.
In this paper we investigate the reasons for this significant deviation from 
historical experience in the German labor market response to the 2008–09 
recession. We highlight the fact that employment rose less than expected 
in the preceding expansion, given changes in GDP and labor costs, and 
that half of this shortfall can be explained using data on employers’ business 
expectations. Employers lacked confidence that the boom would last, or were 
perhaps uncertain about how long it would last, and therefore they hired 
less than would have been predicted given contemporaneous conditions. 
Consequently, they were able to avoid costly layoffs when the recession 
arrived. Our survey of reporting by the Handelsblatt business newspaper 
confirms a general impression that firms downsized and restructured in the 
2005–06 period, out of caution about the extent and persistence of the 
business upturn. The missing employment increase in the boom accounts 
for 41 percent of the missing employment decline in the recession, and 
Figure 2.  Output and Labor Market Outcomes in the Last Five German Recessionsa
Real GDP
Source: German Federal Statistical Office.
a. Data are seasonally adjusted. Recession dates are from the Sachverständigenrat (2010): 
1973Q2–1975Q2, 1979Q4–1982Q4, 1991Q1–1993Q3, 2001Q1–2005Q2, 2008Q1–2009Q2.
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23 percent of that missing decline can be linked to pessimistic expectations 
in the expansion.
If labor costs had responded more flexibly than in the past, this could also 
have contributed to explaining the unusually mild labor market response 
to the recession. In fact, labor costs continued to show little flexibility, 
res ponding too late to stem employment losses. Some previous analysts 
(Boysen-Hogrefe and Groll 2010, Gartner and Klinger 2010) have instead 
suggested a role for the stagnation of wages beginning in 2001, coinciding 
with a decline in the power of labor unions. We find that wage moderation 
may explain 20 percent of the missing employment decline in the recession.
Although we cannot account for about 40 percent of the missing decline 
in employment, we believe that a personnel management tool known as 
working time accounts, which became increasingly common in labor union 
contracts over time, played a role in moderating the labor market downturn. 
Working time accounts permit employers to use overtime for free as long 
as working time is cut by an equal amount within a defined window of 
time. When the recession arrived, workers had built up large surpluses in 
these accounts, which would have had to be compensated at the overtime 
premium if the workers were then laid off. Alternatively, employers could 
have kept these workers employed at low hours until the accounts were 
drawn down to zero, and then laid them off, but by then the time until 
the expected upswing might not have been long enough to amortize the 
normal layoff and hiring costs that would have been incurred. Employers 
therefore laid off fewer workers in the 2008–09 recession than in earlier 
recessions when working time accounts were less widespread, preferring 
to draw down the surpluses by cutting workers’ hours (at unchanged pay).
Many analysts have assumed that these cuts came in addition to the cuts 
that would have occurred in the absence of the accounts, and that the addi-
tional flexibility in hours per worker thus played a key role in moderating 
employment losses.1 However, use of the accounts largely substituted for 
other methods of reducing hours per worker, including the traditional gov-
ernment short-time work scheme. Overall, although the decline in hours 
per worker was very large, it was consistent with expectations based on 
historical experience and the depth of the recession. The unexpected devel-
opment in the recession was the number of workers able to retain their job 
and experience this decline in hours per worker.
1. These analysts include Schneider and Graef (2010), Klös and Schäfer (2010), Möller 
(2010), and Sachverständigenrat (2010); a less decisive role is attributed by Schaz and 
Spitznagel (2010). Boysen-Hogrefe and Groll (2010) are more skeptical.
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We believe that the 2003–05 labor market reforms helped reduce un -
employment, possibly with a lag that meant the reforms acted as a brake on 
rising unemployment in the recession (as argued by Gartner and Klinger 
2010), and that they may therefore also have acted as a brake on employ-
ment losses. We present a simple model of dynamic labor demand with an 
intensive and an extensive margin that suggests why working time accounts 
and other recent reforms in German labor market institutions constitute a 
regime change that is consistent with the labor market miracle. This model 
treats employment (the extensive margin) as a quasi-fixed factor, while the 
marginal cost of hours rises at the intensive margin. The model explains why 
regime change and expectations interact to affect the dynamic behavior of 
employment and hours per worker. Reforms and other changes in the labor 
market caused the quasi-fixity of employment to increase, and employers 
to react more slowly to changes in economic conditions, effectively attaching 
more weight to future expected changes in forcing variables such as wages 
or demand conditions.
We cannot evaluate whether employers correctly expected a shorter 
recession than usual, and hence hoarded more labor than usual, as available 
expectations data refer only to 6 months ahead. Reporting in Handelsblatt 
did suggest that, especially by 2009, firms were concerned about losing 
skilled workers, who are becoming increasingly specialized and difficult to 
replace over time. It is plausible that employers are increasingly reluctant 
to part with a greater share of their workers because of the increasing cost 
of refilling specialized vacancies.
Despite the role of weak hiring in the 2005–07 expansion in explain-
ing the resilience of the labor market in the recession, the moniker “labor 
market miracle” may still be appropriate, given the amount of the puzzle left 
unquantified and possibly due to private and public labor market reforms. 
We deemphasize flexibility in cutting hours per worker only because it 
played an equally important role in moderating the employment decline in 
previous, “nonmiraculous” recessions. Such flexibility could be beneficial 
for the United States, but it would be premature to endorse this approach 
without considering all the institutions governing U.S. labor relations (see 
Abraham and Houseman 1993, Boeri and Brückner 2011).
I.  Background to the 2008–09 Recession in Germany
The nature of the Great Recession in Germany was quite different from 
that of its U.S. counterpart. Whereas the United States suffered a decline 
in domestic demand driven by falling net wealth of the household sector, 
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Germany had experienced no housing bubble, and instead the German 
output decline was driven by the collapse of world trade. Figure 3, which 
plots the major components of GDP since 1970, contrasts the stability of 
German consumption in the 2000s with the large swings in imports and, 
particularly, exports in that decade. The government did have to bail out 
several banks, brought down by their international and, especially, U.S. 
investments, and there was concern that German banks remained under-
capitalized in 2010 (OECD 2010b). German exporters saw world trade as 
overreacting to events in the United States, and they may have expected 
a recovery of favorable demand conditions in export-oriented sectors and 
regions of Germany that had been booming previously. In the event, the BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and many key export markets 
in Eastern Europe did recover rapidly.
The 2008–09 recession should be put in the context of the recent history of 
the German economy and labor market. The economy performed sluggishly, 
in terms of both growth and unemployment, from the end of the unification 
boom in 1993 until the expansion that began in 2005. Unification with 
the former East Germany may have played a role: the resulting increase 
in government debt could have led consumers to revise their estimates 
of future wealth downward, depressing consumption, and higher payroll 
taxes may have increased unemployment (Carlin and Soskice 2009). The 
central bank reduced money supply growth to deal with postunification 
inflation, leaving annual inflation below 2 percent from 1995 through 2010; 
Figure 3. components of GdP, Germany, 1970–2010a
Source: German Federal Statistical Office.
a. Data are quarterly and seasonally adjusted and chained to avoid a break at unification.
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Germany is thought to have entered the European monetary union in 1999 
at an exchange rate that overvalued the deutsche mark (Sinn 1999).
An important labor market development was the stagnation of wages 
from 2001 until 2008, after decades of growth. This wage moderation is 
related to the decline in the power of labor unions in Germany since the 
mid-1990s (Dustmann and others 2009). Between 1996 and 2008, union 
coverage shrank from 70 percent to 55 percent in the western part of the 
country and from 57 percent to 40 percent in the east (Ellguth and Kohaut 
2009); wage drift (payment of wages above the collectively bargained 
rate) also declined in the 2000s (Lesch 2010). Pressure on wages in the 
2000s, and hence on union bargaining power, may have come initially 
from the need for a real devaluation after European monetary union; it was 
sustained by the increased attractiveness of offshoring as the European 
Union expanded eastward in 2004 (Sinn 2005). Another contributing fac-
tor may have been the 2003–05 labor market reforms, which we discuss in 
detail below.
The upturn of 2005–07 marked a return to growth and a significant 
reduction in unemployment. German firms restructured their arrangements 
with labor to improve efficiency, especially through increasing the flexibil-
ity of working hours and decentralizing the determination of pay. Whereas 
unions had conceded greater flexibility in the 1980s and 1990s in return 
for a shorter work week (Hunt 1999), in the 2000s they did so in return for 
employment security (reduced outsourcing of production abroad) and more 
training (Carlin and Soskice 2009). Many of these initiatives originated 
in eastern Germany, where firms struggled in the 1990s to achieve com-
petitiveness. German firms are generally considered to have been in good 
financial condition on the eve of the Great Recession.
II.  Decomposing the Miracle
We begin the analysis by quantifying the contributions of productivity and 
person-hours to the downturn in output in 2008–09, and by further splitting 
person-hours into its components: hours per worker, unemployment, and 
labor force participation.
Two facts implicit in figure 2 will be useful for our decomposition, and 
we make them explicit in figure 4. First, the left panel of figure 4 shows 
that hours per worker fell rapidly in the Great Recession. However, their 
path is roughly comparable to that in the shallower 1973–75 recession. 
Second, the right panel shows that hourly labor productivity declined 
substantially. From a historical perspective, this is the true anomaly: the 
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4 percent reduction in productivity in the 2008– 09 recession contrasts with 
strong increases in productivity in the four previous recessions.
II.A. Lessons from a Simple Decomposition
To quantify the contributions of the various components, we start with 
the following decomposition of the change in output:
( )1 ∆ ∆ ∆
∆ ∆
∆
Y Y Y H Y H H H
Y H Y H H L H L
L
= ( ) ( ) +
= ( ) ( ) + ( ) ( )
+ LF L LF LF LF( ) ( ) + ∆ ,
where Y is real GDP, H is person-hours, L is the number of persons 
employed, and LF is the labor force. This relationship comes from log 
differentiation of an expression of output as the product of output per 
hour and person-hours, with the latter in turn written as the product of 
hours per worker, 1 minus the unemployment rate, and the labor force.
Using equation 1, table 2 decomposes (in logarithms) the drop in output 
from peak to trough in both Germany and the United States, as well as for the 
Figure 4. hours per Worker and Productivity in the last five German recessionsa
Hours per worker
Source: German Federal Statistical Office.
a. Data are seasonally adjusted. Recession dates are those listed in figure 2 and are from the Sachver-
ständigenrat (2010).
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longer period 2008Q1–2009Q4 in both countries, which is more relevant 
for employment adjustment.2 The results are quantitatively similar when a 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend (l = 1600) calculated over 1970Q1–2010Q3 is 
removed (not shown). The table shows two striking differences between the 
two countries. First, the behavior of hourly productivity over the recession 
is qualitatively different, rising in the United States but falling in Germany, 
and the implied adjustment in person-hours is much smaller in Germany. 
Second, the decline in person-hours in the United States is associated with 
an increase in unemployment, whereas in Germany it is principally due to 
a reduction in hours per worker. In neither country did a change in the labor 
force contribute significantly to the output decline.
The Great Recession in Germany represents a significant departure 
from Okun’s Law, the statistical relationship between real GDP growth 
and the change in the unemployment rate, as can be seen in table 1. Since 
D(L/LF)/(L/LF) is approximately equal to the change in the unemployment 
rate with an opposite sign, Okun’s relationship becomes a “law” when 
elements of the right-hand side of equation 1 exhibit a stable correlation 
structure. A priori, hours per worker and labor force participation should 
fluctuate procyclically, but the evidence on the cyclicality of hourly produc-
tivity is less clear-cut.3 Evidently, an already unstable Okun’s relationship 
became untethered in Germany during the Great Recession.4 We now turn 
to the factors responsible for its shift.
II.B.  Hours per Worker versus Number of Workers,  
Given Person-Hours
Although Germany and the United States experienced comparable 
recessions and little change in the labor force, German firms in the aggre-
gate reduced person-hours worked by less than U.S. firms did. But given 
person-hours, did German firms exploit the intensive versus the extensive 
2. German employment rises in this table, unlike in table 1, because the focus on the 
peak-to-trough period for GDP misses the employment decline.
3. The real business cycle research agenda is predicated on a procyclical correlation of 
labor productivity with output, albeit a weak one (see, for example, Cooley 1995). In annual 
data for the period 1947–2009, we compute a correlation of growth in real GDP per hour and 
real GDP growth of 0.49; for the period 1990–2009 the correlation declines to 0.03, and it 
falls further, to -0.05, in the last decade. See Galí and van Rens (2010) and www.econ.upenn.
edu/~manovski, accessed March 6, 2011.
4. Regressions of changes in unemployment on changes in log output and a constant for 
the period 1970Q1–2010Q3 show that the Okun relationship accounts for only 7 percent of 
the variance in Germany, as opposed to almost 50 percent in the United States, with an Okun 
coefficient in Germany that is one-fifth the corresponding U.S. estimate.
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margin of hours reduction differently from U.S. firms, or differently from 
their own behavior in past recessions? That the United States and Germany 
adjust hours differently over the cycle has been well established since 
Katharine Abraham and Susan Houseman (1993) showed that, relative to 
the United States, cyclical adjustment in the German labor market occurs 
more in terms of hours per worker than in terms of the number of workers 
(“bodies”).5 In the United States, one-third of the adjustment to a reduc-
tion in person-hours typically comes about through reductions in hours 
per worker, and two-thirds through reductions in the number of workers. 
Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ays¸egül S¸ahin (2010) confirm that the 
Great Recession was little different, with a 30–70 split.
The extensive-versus-intensive margin decomposition for recent Ger-
man recessions is displayed in table 3 for both the raw data and their 
Table 3. decomposition of reductions in Person-hours in last five recessionsa
	 	 	 	 Share	of	change	in	
	 	 	 	 person-hours	due	to	
	 	 Hours	per	 	 change	in	hours	per	
Recession	 Person-hours	 worker	 Employment	 worker	(percent)
1973Q2–1975Q2
Not detrended -7.9 -4.5 -3.4 57
Detrendedb -4.4 -1.8 -2.6 41
1979Q4–1982Q4
Not detrended -4.1 -3.9 -0.2 94
Detrended -2.7 -1.2 -1.5 44
1991Q1–1993Q3
Not detrended -4.4 -0.4 -4.0 9
Detrended -3.1 +0.9 -4.0 -29
2001Q1–2005Q2
Not detrended -3.6 -2.2 -1.5 60
Detrended -2.1 +0.1 -2.2 -5
2008Q1–2009Q2
Not detrended -3.3 -3.5 +0.2 106
Detrended -3.6 -2.8 -0.8 78
Sources: German Federal Statistical Office and authors’ calculations.
a. Calculated from seasonally adjusted data. Recession dates are from the Sachverständigenrat. Second 
and third columns may not sum to the first column because of rounding.
b. After removing a Hodrick-Prescott trend (l=1600) calculated over 1970Q1–2010Q3.
Change	in	(log	points)
5. Their data were for manufacturing only. See also Schaz and Spitznagel (2010).
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HP-detrended counterparts. With the exception of the 1991–93 episode, 
at least half of the raw hours reduction can be accounted for by reduc-
tions in hours per worker (last column). Although all the person-hours 
adjustment in the 2008–09 recession occurred through hours per worker, 
this was not unprecedented and is comparable to what happened in the 
1979–82 downturn. With an adjustment share for hours per worker of 
only 9 percent, the 1991–93 recession is an outlier, associated, we be lieve, 
with the expiry of reunification-related policies that kept hours per worker 
low in the former East Germany (Will 2010). The reduction in hours 
per worker was smaller in 2008–09 than in the 1973–75 and 1979–82 
recessions.
The raw results thus confirm that Germany adjusts more along the 
intensive margin than does the United States. Because of a downward trend 
in hours per worker that ended in the 2000s, HP detrending reduces the 
share of adjustment due to hours per worker and increases this share in 
2008–09 relative to other recessions. The 2008–09 recession was unusual 
in that employers could not benefit from an ongoing trend-related reduction 
in hours per worker in order to adjust.
III.  The German Puzzle: More Detail
We have shown that German labor market performance in the Great 
Recession derives from a relatively standard reduction in hours per worker 
and a remarkably small reduction in employment. But to what extent is 
this outcome itself unusual, given the sharp drop in GDP and a moderation 
of labor costs? Does the recent period represent a deviation from standard 
operating procedure in German labor markets, and if so, for which sectors? 
In this section we explore this question in more detail.
III.A. Hours per Worker
The German labor market outcome that has attracted the most attention 
from both German and U.S. analysts is the reduction in working hours per 
worker. We have shown that the 2008–09 decline in hours per worker was 
similar to the 1973–75 fall despite a much larger reduction in GDP. The 
question that naturally arises is, how different was the decline in hours per 
worker, conditioning on output and labor costs? We formalize our analy-
sis using out-of-sample forecasts based on reduced-form regressions of 
hours per worker (H/L) on GDP (Y	) and labor costs per worker (w), the 
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latter including all social security contributions.6 Since our focus is on 
the business cycle, we favor a regression in one-quarter differences to 
capture cyclical fluctuations in H/L:7
( ) log log log .2 0 1 2∆ ∆ ∆ ∆H L Y wt t t t( ) = + + +δ δ δ µ
We also extend this to estimate an error correction model:
( ) log log log log3 3 4 5 6∆ ∆ ∆H L Y w H Lt t t( ) = + + + ( )δ δ δ δ t
t t tY w
−
− −
+ + +
1
7 1 8 1δ δ ωlog log .∆
It is important to include information on the major recessions of the 1970s 
and 1980s as well as the mild recession of the early 2000s and the atypical 
postunification slump, and therefore we chain the West German and the 
unified German time series using overlapping 1991 data (specifically the 
first quarter). We begin estimation with the first year available, 1970, and 
continue through 2003. We stop at 2003 because of the introduction that 
year of the Hartz labor market reforms, which we describe in detail below. 
Standard errors are Newey-West based on four lags.
The results of these regressions are reported in the first two columns of 
table 4, and the predicted values of H/L, formed from cumulating predicted 
changes in H/L, are plotted in figure 5. It is evident that actual hours per 
worker were in secular decline from 1990 to 2003 before flattening out in 
2004, then falling sharply in the 2008–09 recession, and snapping back in 
the recovery. (An alternative version of this figure in the online appendix, 
at www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea/past-editions.aspx, shows that the 
trend in hours per worker goes back to at least 1970.) As already revealed 
by the HP detrending in table 3, a large component of the declines observed 
in the 1970s recessions reflected the secular trend in hours per worker. 
6. We use aggregate, quarterly, seasonally adjusted data from the German Federal 
Statistical Office. The labor cost statistics provided in the national income accounts do not 
reflect the savings to employers from using short-time work, because both the benefits to the 
workers and the full social security payments are initially made by the employer and only 
subsequently rebated. However, throughout our analysis we use labor cost numbers adjusted 
to reflect these rebates. We use data from the Statistische	Jahrbücher on the accounts of the 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit and its predecessor, transforming these yearly data into quarterly 
data according to the distribution over the year of hours lost to short-time work. This adjustment 
is trivial in magnitude at the aggregate level except in the 1973–75 and 2008–09 recessions, 
and even in these recessions it is very small.
7. A regression in levels, which picks up low-frequency fluctuations, yields a statistically 
insignificant coefficient on GDP.
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Table 4. regressions explaining changes in hours per Worker, employment, 
and changes in employmenta
	 Dependent	variable
	 Change	in	hours		
	 per	worker	(DH/L)
	 Simple	 	 	 	
	 one-quarter-	 Error	 	 Change	in	
	 differences	 correction	 Employment	 employmentb
Independent	variable	 model	 model	 (Lt)	 (DL)
DGDP 0.18 0.17  0.18
 (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05)
DLabor costs per workerc 0.09 0.13  -0.05
 (0.05) (0.05)  (0.04)
Hours per workert-1  -0.07  -0.09
  (0.02)  (0.04)
GDPt-1  -0.03 0.69 0.05
  (0.01) (0.06) (0.02)
Labor costs per workert-1c  0.01 -0.51 -0.05
  (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
Trend   -0.0035
   (0.0011)
Constant -0.0036 0.4118 18.4279 1.0784
 (0.0004) (0.2003) (2.0600) (0.4663)
R2 0.23 0.31 0.97 0.25
No. of observations 135 135 135 135
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. All variables except the trend are in logarithms. Newey-West standard errors based on four lags are 
in parentheses. Data are quarterly data from 1970 to 2003, seasonally adjusted.
b. Estimated using error correction model.
c. Adjusted for reimbursements for short-time payments and short-time-related social security payments.
Both regression models predict a fall in hours per worker similar to the 
actual fall, as is seen most clearly when the predicted changes are cumu-
lated from 2008Q1, when GDP peaked. What is different in 2008–09 is not 
the magnitude of the reduction in hours per worker, but that it occurred in 
the absence of an existing trend. We interpret this finding as evidence that 
methods of adjustment have changed, a topic to which we return below.
III.B. Employment
To analyze employment, we begin by estimating the error correction 
model in equation 3 for employment. Again, our aim is to analyze fluctua-
tions over the cycle. Because employment fluctuates less than hours per 
worker at high frequency, the coefficient on GDP is considerably higher in 
levels regressions, which capture low-frequency variation. Our preferred 
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specification is therefore that in levels, with a trend included and with the 
covariates lagged to avoid endogeneity. We include four lags of GDP for 
consistency with later regressions, although only the first has a statistically 
significant coefficient here (higher-order lags of labor costs generally have 
insignificant coefficients):
( ) log log log log4 9 10 1 11 2 12L Y Y Yt t t t= + + +− − −δ δ δ δ 3
13 4 14 1 15+ + + +− −δ δ δ µlog log .Y w tt t t
The regression results are reported in the last two columns of table 4, and 
the actual and predicted values are plotted in figure 6. As already seen in fig-
ures 1 and 2, actual employment rises in the boom of 2005–07, but instead of 
plunging in 2008– 09, as in previous recessions, it merely levels off. The figure 
shows that, according to our preferred specification, employment would have 
been expected to fall by a large amount, similar to that in the 1973–74 reces-
sion, given the movements in GDP and labor costs per worker. The error cor-
rection model fits the data poorly and suggests that the modest downturn was 
not very surprising. We do not find this specification convincing.
Interestingly, according to both specifications, employment should have 
risen more than it did in the upturn that immediately preceded the 2008–09 
Figure 5. hours per Worker, actual 1990–2010 and Predicted 2004 –10a
Source: German Federal Statistical Office and authors’ calculations.
a. Hours per worker are per quarter. Predicted values are calculated using the regression results 
reported in the first two columns of table 4. ECM = error correction model.
b. Seasonally adjusted and chained to avoid a break at reunification. 
Log points
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
5.9
5.8
6.0
Actualb
Predicted with change in GDP,
per-worker labor costs
Predicted, ECM, from 2008
Predicted, ECM, from 2004
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recession, even though the upturn was unconditionally large.8 This sug-
gests the possibility that fewer workers than expected were laid off in the 
recession because they had not been hired in the boom, a possibility that 
figures prominently in our analysis later on.9
III.C. Composition Effects: Where Are the Missing Job Losses?
In order to understand the behavior of labor markets in the Great 
Recession, it is important to know which industries behaved unusually. 
Discussion of the U.S. recession has focused on the financial, construc-
tion, durable consumption goods, and retail services industries, which had 
swelled in the previous two decades. In the case of Germany, we look for 
patterns in the sectoral structure of employment declines. Can we find sectors 
in which person-hours and employment should have contracted, given the 
drop in demand and past behavior, but in fact did not?
The upper panel of figure 7 traces value added by sector (omitting agri-
culture) from 1970 to 2010 (as before, the data are chained to remove the 
jump at unification). The 2008 slump in value added in manufacturing is 
striking in the historical context: the fall of 23 percent between 2007Q4 
Figure 6. employment, actual and Predicted, 1970–2010a
8. Logeay and Zwiener (2008) also make this observation by comparing this expansion 
with the previous one.
9. We have verified that no similar pattern of prediction errors occurs when the 1970s 
and 1980s boom-and-bust cycles are predicted out of sample.
Source: German Federal Statistical Office and authors’ calculations.
a. Employment is in thousands of workers. Actual data are quarterly and seasonally adjusted and 
chained to avoid a break at unification. Predicted values are calculated using the regression results 
reported in the third and fourth columns of table 4. Shading indicates 95 percent confidence interval on 
the predicted series using the levels model.
Log points
1990198519801975 1995 2000 2005 2010
10.45
10.55
10.40
10.50
10.60
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95% confidence interval
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and 2009Q1 is considerably larger even than the loss in value added that 
accompanied the postunification recession and the collapse of eastern Ger-
man manufacturing in the early 1990s. By contrast, employment in this 
sector fell by a modest amount in 2008–09 by historical standards, as the 
lower panel shows. The figure also shows that the manufacturing boom 
beginning in 2005 was large by historical standards (upper panel) but was 
not accompanied by a historically large employment increase (lower panel).
Construction is also a cyclical sector, in terms of both value added and 
employment. The unification-related boom and bust in both series are 
evident, and the partial recovery in 2006 may also be seen. The trade 
Figure 7. Value added and employment by Sector, 1970–2010a
Value added
Source: German Federal Statistical Office and authors’ calculations.
a. Data are quarterly and seasonally adjusted and chained to avoid a break at unification.
b. Includes mining.
c. Finance, insurance, real estate, and other business services.
d. Health, education, and other public and personal services.
e. Includes the hospitality industry and transportation.
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sector, which includes wholesale and retail trade as well as the hospitality 
industry and transportation, shows signs of a small boom, bust, and recov-
ery in both series from 2006 to 2010. The FIRE (finance, insurance, real 
estate, and other business services) and other services (health, education, 
and other public or personal services) sectors are not cyclical and display 
upward trends throughout the period. There has been a significant increase 
in employment in temporary agencies in Germany since their deregulation 
in 2003 (Burda and Kvasnicka 2006). Despite their name, temporary help 
workers work under the same contractual conditions as other employees, 
including employment protection. Regardless of where they are actually 
working, their employment and value added are attributed to the FIRE cat-
egory in the national income accounts. Manufacturing generally accounts for 
a large share of the use of temporary workers (Burda and Kvasnicka 2006), 
but the distribution of its use over time is unknown.
To predict where job losses would have been expected based on past 
experience, we employ the sector-specific analogue of equation 4:
( ) log log log lo5 0 1 1 2 2 3L V Vit i i it i it i= + + +− −γ β β β g
log log ,
V
V w t
it
i it i t i it
−
− −
+ + + +
3
4 4 1 1 2β γ γ η
where V is value added and i indicates the sector. Value added, in turn, 
is a function of the components of GDP (GDP alone is a poor predictor of 
sectoral value added) and a linear trend:
( ) log log log log6 0 1 2 3
4
V C I Git i i t i t i t= + + +
+
α α α α
α i t i t i itX Z tlog log ,+ + +α α ε5 6
where C is consumption, I investment, G government spending, X exports, 
and Z imports. Using these equations, we can judge how much of an unpre-
dictable employment change is due to a surprise in how employment reacted 
to a change in value added (the change in the residual from equation 5, Dhit) 
and how much is due to unexpected developments in value added itself 
(b1i times the change in the lagged residual from equation 6, Dit-1, plus 
the terms corresponding to the other three lags, Sjbji Dit-j). We focus on 
the three more cyclical sectors, since prediction errors in employment for 
FIRE and other services stem principally from the slowing of upward 
trends, which means we are examining employment of core, nontemporary 
workers. We also estimate equation 5 for the whole economy (including 
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temporary workers). As before, we estimate the equations using data from 
1970 to 2003. Table 5 presents key numbers for the 2008–09 recession 
and the preceding expansion, and the underlying regression results are 
reported in table 6.
The first row in the top panel of table 5 shows that whereas aggregate 
employment was almost unchanged in the recession, it would have been 
expected to fall by 4.2 log points given value added and labor costs, 
implying a 3.9-log-point prediction error. The second row shows that 
employment in manufacturing fell only 3.8 log points in the bust, com-
pared with an expected fall of 17.6 log points given value added and labor 
costs, for a prediction error of 13.7 log points. This 13.7-log-point gap may 
be considered the missing employment decline in manufacturing. To relate 
manufacturing to the missing aggregate employment decline (given GDP), 
it is necessary to consider the unexpected change in value added in manu-
facturing. In the next two columns of table 5, we present information on 
the first lag, which is generally the most influential: value added plunged 
23.6 log points, considerably more than would have been predicted given 
the components of GDP (16.4 log points) when all four lags of value added 
Table 5. Sources of unexpected changes in employment in the 2008–09 recession 
and the Preceding expansion
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 Sum	of
      weighted	
	 Actual	 Predicted	 Residual	 Actual	 Predicted	 residualsc
Industry DLi	 DLˆiVi ,	w	 Dhˆit	 DVit-1 DVˆ it-1GDPt-1b Sj(bjDˆit-j)
Recession	(2008Q3–2009Q3)
All industries -0.002 -0.042 0.039
Manufacturingd -0.038 -0.176 0.137 -0.236 -0.164 -0.057
Construction 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.046 0.040 0.001
Tradee 0.002 -0.020 0.021 -0.062 -0.039 -0.001
Expansion	(2005Q2–2008Q3)
All industries 0.039 0.055 -0.016
Manufacturingd 0.017 0.083 -0.066 0.112 0.098 0.022
Construction 0.003 0.026 -0.023 0.086 -0.062 0.080
Tradee 0.029 0.057 -0.027 0.066 0.018 0.018
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Numbers may not sum because of rounding.
b. “GDP” here refers to the components of GDP. See equation 6 in the text.
c. Reflects the change in employment due to unexpected changes in lagged value added terms (see text).
d. Includes mining.
e. Includes the hospitality industry and transportation.
Change	in	lagged		
value	addedChange	in	employmenta
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are considered, offsetting by 5.7 log points the error that would have been 
made in predicting the change in employment based on the components 
of GDP and labor costs. Summing the components of the third and sixth 
columns, based on the components of GDP and labor costs, we find that 
manufacturing employment would have been expected to fall by 8.0 log 
points more than it did.
There was a slight increase in employment in construction during the 
recession (by 0.9 log point), close to the predicted increase of 0.4 log point 
based on value added and labor costs. For construction, all lags of value 
added play a significant role, and so the fourth and fifth columns are less 
informative than for other sectors; the last column shows that when all 
lags are taken into account, there was no surprise in the evolution of value 
added given the components of GDP. The statistical stability of construction 
employment is not a surprise, for two reasons: first, Germany experienced 
no real estate boom in the run-up to the recession, and second, a large 
component of the stimulus program was directed to government construction 
projects.
Our findings for the trade sector show excess hires of 2.1 log points, 
with no offsetting effect from value added, which is well predicted. The 
missing cyclical job losses (of core workers) appear, therefore, to be from 
manufacturing.
We observed in figure 6 that the 2005–07 expansion created fewer jobs 
than expected, and in figure 7 that the expansion in manufacturing did not 
appear to generate many jobs in the sector. We examine this more formally 
in the bottom panel of table 5. Aggregate employment rose 3.9 log points 
but would have been predicted to rise by 5.5 log points based on value 
added and labor costs, for a shortfall of 1.6 log points. Did the expected 
decline in employment during the bust not materialize because the workers 
had not been hired in the boom? If so, the magnitude of the hiring shortfall 
is 1.6/3.9 = 41 percent of the layoff shortfall in the recession. The last three 
rows of the table indicate that the missing employment increase (in core 
workers) was concentrated in manufacturing.
IV.  Economic and Institutional Explanations
We have established that GDP in the Great Recession fell more in Germany 
than in the United States, while person-hours fell less. Yet in that downturn 
as well as in the preceding boom, German employment responded less than 
usual to changes in GDP and labor costs, and so the putative miracle lies in 
the muted response of employment, in particular in manufacturing (at least 
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for core, nontemporary workers). We now turn to some possible economic 
and institutional explanations for these statistical findings.
IV.A. A Simple Model of Dynamic Labor Demand
Employment would respond less to changes in GDP and labor costs 
if costs of changing the workforce have risen, or if employers doubt the 
persistence of those changes. To help organize our thinking about possible 
causes of changing firm behavior, we use a standard model of dynamic 
labor demand to study the impact of changing costs of labor input as well 
as that of expectations.10 For simplicity, we study a representative firm that 
acts competitively in both product and labor markets and has no capital 
investment decision to make, allowing us to focus on the extensive and 
intensive margins of hours adjustment. In period t = 0, the representative 
firm chooses plans for employment {Lt} and hours per worker {qt} so as to 
maximize real expected discounted profits:
E0 1
2
2
β θ θt t t t t t t t t tPY W L L c L L− ( ) − − −( )

−Ω Φt =
∞∑
0 ,
subject to the production function Yt = f(Ht), where Ht = qtLt plus an initial 
condition L0, taking the sequences of hourly base wages {Wt} and prices 
{Pt}, both measured in terms of a numeraire good, as given. (E0 denotes 
the expectation conditional on information available in period 0.) Costs of 
changing the level of core employment Lt from the past period’s value Lt-1 
are quadratic in the change and parametrized by c. An hour of a worker’s time 
who is already working qt hours costs WtW(qt), with W′ > 0 and constant 
elasticity hWq.11 There is a fixed per worker employment charge F.
Optimal behavior of the firm is straightforward to derive and is presented 
in the online appendix. It is important to distinguish between long-run 
10. See Treadway (1970) and Sargent (1978). Other models of labor demand involving 
lumpy costs of adjustment may also be employed (Hamermesh 1989, Hamermesh and Pfann 
1996), but in aggregation their implications are difficult to distinguish from conventional 
models with convex costs of adjustment (Khan and Thomas 2003).
11. A more realistic formal model would relate overtime in working time accounts 
(sustained cumulated deviations of q from its normal value) to employment adjustment costs 
directly by carrying the latter as a state variable, so that the more extensive the use made of 
such accounts in a boom, the more costly the adjustment downward in the aftermath. Such 
a model is formally more difficult to handle, and so we have taken the shortcut of treat-
ing employment adjustment costs as parametric and studying the differential behavior of 
employment across different parameter values.
296 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
steady-state and short-run dynamic behavior. In the long run, two equa-
tions govern the intensive and extensive margins (dropping subscripts):
( )7 WΩ ΦΩθ η θθ( ) =
( ) .8 1Pf L
W
′( )
( ) = +
θ
θ
η θΩ Ω
Given W,	P, F, and the function W, steady-state hours per worker (q) are 
determined by equation 7. Given q, equation 8 determines employment L 
and total hours H = qL. It is straightforward to show that the base wage W 
reduces, while the fixed cost F increases, steady-state hours per worker. 
An increase in hWq, holding all else constant, will reduce hours per worker 
but have an ambiguous effect on L.
Although these long-run implications are well understood, the model 
also contains predictions for high-frequency changes in optimal allocation 
of hours across the intensive and the extensive margins, given current and 
expected future wages Wt and output prices Pt (the latter being a proxy for 
aggregate demand). Using carets to denote percentage deviations from the 
steady state, we can describe optimal employment and hours per worker by 
the following two recursive equations:
( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ9 1L L
c L
P W Pt t P t W t t= + ( ) − −− + +λ λβ λβ ϕ ϕ
τ
τ τ
Φ
+=
∞ ( ) ∑ ττ 0
( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,10 θ η ηθ θt L t W t tL W P= − − −( )
where the elasticities jP, jW, hqL, and hqW are all positive and l is the stable 
root (0 < l < 1) of the difference equation governing optimal employment. 
Details can be found in the online appendix.
The above equations characterize optimal labor demand as a short-term 
reaction via hours per worker and a longer-term reaction via employment, 
which depends on its own past value with persistence determined by l. 
This crucial parameter not only summarizes the sluggishness of employ-
ment but also represents the weight applied to expected values of the future 
output price and wages as determinants of employment. Expectations of 
future demand and factor prices play a central role in shaping the reaction 
of employment to current shocks. Analogous to the permanent income 
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theory of consumption, the model predicts that for given model parameters, 
employment reacts more strongly to changes in current aggregate demand 
and wages when these are expected to be permanent rather than temporary. 
From equation 9, the larger is l, the greater the weight applied to future 
versus present determinants of labor demand. Crucially for what follows, 
an increase in the persistence parameter l could be attributed to an increase 
in the adjustment cost parameter c or to a decrease in hWq, the steepness with 
which the cost of using the intensive margin rises, or to both. In the follow-
ing sections, we search for specific institutional and economic changes in 
German labor markets that relate to these theoretical implications.
IV.B. Flexibility in Reducing Hours per Worker
Although our analysis suggests that the decline in hours per worker in 
the 2008–09 recession was not surprising given the depth of the reces-
sion, it makes sense to start where so much attention has been directed 
in both the United States and Germany. In this section we explain why, 
despite the availability of new tools to adjust hours per worker, there was 
no surprise.
ShOrt-time WOrK (kURzARBEIt ). One central reason often adduced for 
U.S.-German labor market differences is the differing systems of compen-
sation in the two countries: the German system combines high firing costs, 
lengthy severance notice periods, and selective access to short-time com-
pensation subsidies from the government, all of which encourage employ-
ers to cut hours per worker rather than bodies. In contrast, firing in the 
United States is a low-cost means of employment reduction; short-time pay 
is rarely used and designed only to insure very low earners against hours 
reductions. Yet it is noteworthy that the use of short-time work did not 
prevent large rises in unemployment in previous German recessions. The 
highly regarded German short-time work system (Kurzarbeit) is frequently 
cited in the business press as a central factor mitigating sharp rises in 
unemployment in Germany.12
Short-time work has existed in Germany for a century. The under-
lying idea is that a firm in “unavoidable” financial difficulties due to a 
documented shortfall of orders can apply in writing to the employment 
office, which administers the unemployment insurance program and active 
labor market policies, for short-time support. The firm then refrains from 
12. Ralph Atkins, “Europe Reaps the Rewards of State-Sponsored Short-Time Jobs,” 
Financial	Times, October 28, 2009. OECD (2010a) evaluates short-time programs in different 
countries.
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layoffs but reduces workers’ hours and variable pay in proportion. Workers 
receive between 60 and 67 percent of the net pay they would have received 
for the hours not demanded. Firms pay workers this Kurzarbeitergeld 
(“short-time money”) and are later reimbursed by the employment agency 
through the unemployment insurance fund. In previous recessions, firms 
were expected to pay social security and other contributions of workers 
in full, causing average labor costs to rise with the reduction of hours. 
Implementation of short-time work at the firm level must be agreed to 
and is monitored by the works council (the establishment-level organiza-
tion charged with representing workers’ interests), which may help protect 
workers from potential abuse of the system by management.
The short-time work scheme was expanded aggressively in several ways 
in the course of the Great Recession. Firms could claim subsidies for up 
to 24 months instead of 6, and the required minimum number of affected 
workers was reduced. In late 2008 and early 2009, the Federal Employment 
Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) took out newspaper advertisements 
encouraging firms to apply for short-time subsidies. In addition, the govern-
ment assumed half the social insurance costs of the affected workers under 
a number of specific conditions. Even temporary help workers in Germany, 
who work on regular contracts for their agencies, were eligible for short-time 
subsidies from March 2009 onward and remain eligible until March 2012. 
Figure 8 shows that despite the intensity of these efforts, the number of 
Figure 8. hours of Work lost through Short-time Work, 1970–2010a
Source: Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung.
a. Data are quarterly; no adjustment is made to avoid a break at German unification.
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person-hours lost to short-time work was comparable to that in the shallower 
1973–75 recession.13 On the basis of the volume of reduced time, the use of 
short-time work represented the equivalent of about 400,000 jobs in 2009 
(Schneider and Graef 2010), or 1 percent of total employment. Tito Boeri 
and Herbert Bruecker (2011) point out, however, that such calculations 
overstate the number of jobs saved.14
WOrKinG time accOuntS. Some analysts attribute the small magnitude 
of the fall in employment to reductions in hours per worker of another type. 
The system of working time accounts (Arbeitszeitkonten) allows employers 
the freedom to increase hours above standard hours with no immediate 
payment, as long as hours are reduced at some future time with no cut 
in take-home pay, leaving hours at the standard when averaged over a 
window of time. The number of hours the employer owes the worker, which 
may be negative, is tracked in the worker’s working time account. The 
share of workers with such an account rose from 33 percent in 1998 to 
48 percent in 2005, and the average window in 2005 was 30 weeks (Gross 
and Schwarz 2007).15
The model of the previous section predicts that working time accounts 
would reduce labor costs and increase labor demand, inducing a positive 
scale effect and substitution from the extensive to the intensive labor margin.16 
The last effect occurs because the accounts reduce overtime premia and the 
sensitivity of wage costs to the intensive margin, possibly to zero. Person-
hours should increase, but the effect on employment is ambiguous. Over 
the firm’s cycle, working time accounts reduce overtime pay and the cost 
of adjusting hours per worker, so hours per worker should fluctuate more, 
while employment should adjust more sluggishly.17
Table 7 shows exactly what accounted for the decline in hours per 
worker between 2008 and 2009 (analysis is difficult at quarterly frequency 
13. This has already been noted by Herzog-Stein and Seifert (2010).
14. There is a special short-time work scheme for firms that are restructuring, which 
involves employees “working” zero hours. Although this scheme was used massively in the 
east in the early 1990s, in 2009 it accounted for only 8.6 percent of short-time payments 
(and therefore of short-time hours).
15. Gross and Schwarz (2007) also document that employers sometimes violate some 
provisions of the agreements, and it is possible that in practice the windows are longer than 
30 weeks. Still, working time accounts would have waned in importance compared with 
short-time work as 2009 wore on.
16. In a model with physical capital, substitution from capital to labor would also occur.
17. The lower reallocation of labor in a recession brought about by working time accounts 
may lower the economy’s productivity, but this is offset by firms’ higher productivity during 
periods of smaller fluctuations.
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and impossible by sector). Annual hours per worker fell by 41.3 hours, 
or 3.1 percent. The largest contributing factor was short-time work, which 
accounted for 13.4 hours, or 32 percent of the total decline. A reduction in 
standard weekly hours was the next biggest factor (accounting for about 
one-quarter of the reduction), followed by approximately equal contribu-
tions from reductions in overtime, reductions in working time account 
balances, and the increase in the share of workers who are part-time 
(17 to 19 percent each). Previous authors (Schneider and Graef 2010, Klös 
and Schäfer 2010, Möller 2010, Sachverständigenrat 2010) have pointed 
to the contribution of working time accounts as evidence that hours per 
worker fell more than in previous recessions thanks to this newly expanded 
institution (presumably 17 percent more), thus allowing more jobs to be 
saved. Mechanically, the drawing down of working time accounts cor-
responds to 0.5 percent of annual hours and hence could be considered 
to have “saved” 0.5 percent of employment. The second column of table 7 
confirms the number cited above of a “savings” equivalent to 1 percent 
of jobs through short-time work.
Firms do not immediately save money by reducing surpluses in working 
time accounts, so it is not immediately obvious why firms would do so in a 
severe downturn rather than lay off workers. However, a worker’s account 
must be paid off if the worker is laid off, either as a severance payment 
including the overtime premium, or in the form of low hours at full pay 
Table 7. Sources of changes in hours per Worker, 2008–09a
	 Change,	2008–09
	 	 As	percent	of	 As	percent	of	
	 Hours	per	 annual	hours	 total	decline	
Source	of	change	 worker	 per	worker	 in	hours
Short-time work -13.4 -1.0 32
Standard weekly hours -10.1 -0.8 24
Overtime -7.9 -0.6 19
Part-time share -7.5 -0.6 18
Working time accounts -7.0 -0.5 17
Calendar effectb -0.7 -0.1 2
Sick days 0.1 0.0 0
Second jobs 0.6 0.0 -1
Vacation days 4.6 0.3 -11
  Sum: annual hours per worker -41.3 -3.1 100
Source: IAB (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) Working Time Calculation and authors’ 
calculations.
a. Calculations are based on the change in the yearly average from 2008 to 2009.
b. Reflects the different number of working days in the two years.
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before the layoff takes effect.18 All things equal, firms using working 
time accounts will have an incentive to postpone layoffs at the start of a 
recession, instead drawing down workers’ surplus time in their accounts. 
Once a worker’s account is at zero, the worker may be laid off, but by 
then the upturn may be sufficiently near that it is no longer worthwhile 
incurring the normal firing and hiring costs that apply to all workers. In 
November 2007 a ruling of the Federal Labor Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht 
2010) strengthened the layoff disincentive by holding that an employer 
could not lay off a worker if any co-worker doing the same job had a surplus 
in his or her account.19 The analysis is more complex when the availability 
of the government short-time scheme is taken into account. It is no longer 
unambiguous that firms using working time accounts lay off less, but they 
will lay off less if the accumulated surplus hours are sufficiently large, a 
condition likely to have been fulfilled in 2008.
A different consideration is that a firm that has workers with working 
time account surpluses has less incentive to use the short-time work scheme 
than a firm that does not, because using short-time work does not draw 
down the working time accounts. A surplus firm that uses short-time work 
during a recession will have to buy out its workers’ surplus hours, because 
the window within which the working time accounts must be in balance 
will expire. If the surpluses are very large, the firm will prefer to draw them 
down rather than use short-time work, as the short-time compensation will 
not outweigh the excess hours compensation the firm would have to pay 
the workers. Thus, it is theoretically possible, as well as consistent with the 
fact that short-time work was not used more than in the milder 1973–75 
recession, that the increased use of working time accounts crowded out 
short-time work in the 2008–09 recession. Reductions in hours per worker 
through working time accounts may not have come entirely at the expense 
of short-time work. In previous recessions, the downward trend in hours 
per worker contributed to the reduction in hours per worker, and working 
time accounts may also have compensated for the lack of such a trend 
in the Great Recession. However, the first column of table 4 shows that 
this trend was -0.36 log point per quarter, which is large compared with 
18. When a worker with a working time account works an hour of overtime, she gets paid 
nothing for that hour, but one hour is credited to her account. The balance reverts to zero if she 
is given an hour off with pay within the window. If she is laid off with an hour’s balance in 
her account, she must be compensated at the normal hourly wage plus the overtime premium.
19. For more details on how working accounts worked in the Great Recession, see Zapf 
and Brehmer (2010). For a detailed description in English of working time accounts, see 
Seifert (2004).
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the 0.5 percent yearly reduction in hours due to working time accounts 
(second column of table 7). Hours per worker must have adjusted along other 
margins in the recession to compensate for the cessation of the trend.
uncOmPenSated hOurS reductiOnS: WOrKinG time cOrridOrS. Another 
relatively new, but less frequently used, option for firms wishing to reduce 
hours per worker involves the so-called working time corridors (Arbeitszeit-
korridore). These are commonly included in the “opening clauses” conceded 
by unions in negotiations with employers as their bargaining power has 
continued to weaken in the past decade. Opening clauses permit firms to 
take extraordinary measures in extraordinary times, subject to agreement 
by the works council. A firm invoking an opening clause with a working 
time corridor provision may reduce total working hours, reducing its labor 
costs proportionately. This option is inferior to short-time work for the 
worker, because the lost income is not replaced by a government benefit. It 
is superior to short-time work for the firm in one important respect: unlike 
in the case of short-time work, all fixed costs (such as annual vacation and 
Christmas pay) and social security contributions are reduced proportionately, 
as well as wages (Hoff 2009). However, the hours reductions permitted are 
typically on the order of 15 percent, much less than is possible with short-
time work. Perhaps for this reason, opening clauses appear to have been 
used little to reduce working time in the 2008–09 recession. A 2009 survey 
of works councils indicated that only 8 percent of firms were using this 
measure, compared with 30 percent that were drawing down surpluses or 
building up deficits in working time accounts, 20 percent that were using 
short-time work, and 13 percent that were adjusting through vacation time 
(Bogedan and others 2009). The data behind the decomposition of table 7 
do not allow cuts through working time corridors to be identified, but they 
would appear under changes in standard weekly hours.
IV.C. Labor Costs
The small magnitude of the employment decline in the 2008–09 reces-
sion could be explained if labor costs had become more flexible and the 
adjustment to the drop in labor demand came through a decline in labor 
costs, rather than a decline in employment as in the past. Such a decline 
could have occurred through the use of opening clauses in union contracts, 
which, in addition to permitting the working time corridors mentioned 
above, sometimes allow employers to cut hourly wages in a downturn. 
Perhaps surprisingly, this option appears to have been used infrequently: 
the 2009 survey of works councils indicates that only 11 percent of firms 
did so (Bogedan and others 2009). A decline in labor costs could also have 
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occurred through the introduction of subsidies to offset payroll taxes for 
employers using short-time work; such subsidies were introduced for the 
first time in July 2009. However, the amount paid out in short-time payments 
and social security refunds in 2009 was a mere 0.3 percent of the wage bill.20
The top left panel of figure 9 plots hourly labor costs for the period 
1970–2010Q3 (again chained to eliminate a jump at unification); the top 
right panel focuses on the period 2004–10. Labor cost growth fell to zero 
in 2001 but then surged just as the recession began in 2008, as contracts 
negotiated in the previous year came into force. Labor’s share dropped 
sharply from 1982 to the recession (bottom two panels). Labor costs did fall 
20. Payroll taxation is significant in Germany, at about 35 percent of aggregate gross pay 
currently, compared with only about 12 to 13 percent in the United States, and it has a tendency 
to rise in recessions (Burda and Weder 2010), for two reasons. First, there is a fixed upper 
bound on contributions, as in the United States, and second, payroll taxes tend to be raised 
during recessions to keep the social insurance funds that they finance operating in the black.
Figure 9. labor costs and Productivity, 1970–2010a
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in 2009, but only from the second quarter onward, after GDP had ceased 
to decline, and therefore too late to stem job losses, since our regressions 
suggest that aggregate employment does not respond faster to labor costs 
than to GDP.
Certain authors, particularly Jens Boysen-Hogrefe and Dominik Groll 
(2010) and Hermann Gartner and Sabine Klinger (2011), stress instead 
the importance of the wage moderation that has occurred since 2001 
as providing the conditions under which a recession would lead to only 
mo derate employment losses. To get a sense of the magnitudes that might 
be involved, we examine the counterfactual that labor costs per worker had 
resumed growth at the rate that had prevailed from 1995 to 2000, 1.12 log 
points per year, but that GDP followed its actual course. Our own estimate 
of the compensated elasticity of labor demand is -0.5 (see third column of 
table 4); a value closer to the consensus in the literature is -0.7 (Peichl and 
Siegloch 2010). GDP fell for 4 quarters beginning in 2008Q1, and over this 
length of time, wages in the counterfactual would have risen 1.12 log points, 
reducing employment by 0.7 × 1.12 = 0.8 log point (assuming an elasticity 
of -0.7). Wage moderation could thus account for 0.8/3.9 = 21 percent of 
the missing employment decline. Wage moderation appears to deepen the 
puzzle of sluggish employment growth in the expansion, but it may have 
had a muted effect if employers did not expect this moderation to last, as 
would be implied by a dynamic labor demand model.
IV.D. Labor Market Efficiency
A set of landmark labor reforms was passed in the twilight of the 
left-of-center government led by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. In March 
2003 Schröder put forward the “Agenda 2010,” which sought to increase 
flexibility in German labor markets. A commission headed by Peter Hartz, 
a top Volkswagen executive, and consisting of representatives of unions, 
management, and government, put forward a number of proposals, many of 
which were passed by the federal parliament and put into effect in 2003–05. 
The reforms may loosely be grouped into those reducing reservation wages 
(and therefore reducing wages), those increasing the efficiency of the job 
search process (and therefore increasing wages), and those allowing employ-
ers more flexibility (probably reducing wages). We focus initially on the 
first two categories.21
21. An excellent source in German for information on the reforms is “Die Hartz Reformen” 
(www.hartz-iv-iii-ii-i.de/, accessed March 4, 2011). For a discussion in English, see Ochel 
(2005).
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The Hartz IV law, which reformed unemployment benefits, is particu-
larly likely to have reduced reservation wages. The amount of recent work 
experience required for eligibility was increased, the duration of the benefits 
cut, and the onus of finding a job put for the first time on the unemployed 
person rather than the employment agency. Sanctions for refusing job offers 
were increased and applied more frequently. The follow-on unemploy-
ment assistance program, which provided means-tested benefits potentially 
indefinitely, was merged with the less generous social welfare program. The 
reforms most likely to have improved job search efficiency were Hartz I, 
which enlisted private firms to help workers search for jobs, and Hartz III, 
which reorganized the employment agency.
Theoretically, these reforms should have reduced unemployment, and 
there is some evidence that they did. For example, the unemployment rate of 
50- to 54-year-olds, the group experiencing the largest reduction in benefit 
duration, began falling in 2005 relative to the rate for 25- to 49-year-olds 
and continued to do so throughout the recession (graph available from 
the authors on request). The long-term unemployed (workers with unem-
ployment spells of 1 year or more) peaked as a share of the unemployed 
in 2006 and fell through the recession to 45.5 percent in 2009.22 René Fahr 
and Uwe Sunde (2009) and Klinger and Thomas Rothe (2010) find that the 
efficiency of the job matching function increased, and Gartner and Klinger 
(2011) observe that the Beveridge curve shifted inward and continues to do 
so. Overall, the hypothesis that the Hartz reforms reduced unemployment by 
increasing employment, possibly with a lag that led their effect to continue 
into the recession, is plausible. The potential magnitude is difficult to judge, 
however.
The third set of reforms sought to provide more flexibility to employers. 
In 2003 the threshold size for firms subject to layoff rules was raised from 
5 workers to 10. Hartz II introduced so-called mini-jobs, or part-time forms 
of employment involving monthly income of no greater than 6400, which 
were exempt from most social security taxes. Hartz I significantly deregu-
lated the temporary agency sector, leading to more competition for regular 
employment from temporary workers. These last two reforms are likely to 
have contributed to wage moderation.
How much additional flexibility did the Hartz reforms afford employers? 
The deregulation of the temporary agency sector is considered the most 
important of the reforms in this respect. It gave individual employers 
22. See OECD, “Employment and Labour Markets: Key Tables from the OECD,” 
dx.doi.org/10.1787/20752342-2010.
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flexibility to vary employment without incurring hiring or firing costs, 
and the share of temporary workers rose from 1.3 percent of employment 
in 2005 to 2.6 percent in 2007–08 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2011). But 
the effect on the flexibility of the aggregate economy was smaller, as most 
temporary agency workers have permanent contracts with their agency. 
Employment of temporary workers did fall as soon as the recession hit, well 
before permanent employment responded (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2011). 
Because temporary workers are less attached to the labor force, it is easier 
for temporary agencies to reduce employment by attrition, and it is becom-
ing more common for them to hire workers initially on temporary contracts 
(Burda and Kvasnicka 2006). But the magnitude of the adjustment should 
be put in perspective. The total employment decline among temporary 
workers, at 205,000 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2011), represents only 
0.5 percent of total employment at its 2008 peak. The extra flexibility for 
the aggregate economy appears small, making it plausible that the moderat-
ing effect of working time accounts on employment fluctuations was more 
important.
IV.E. the Role of Expectations in the Boom and the Bust
Employment could have responded more inertially to the 2008–09 reces-
sion because employers expected it to be shorter than usual. This recession, 
although deep, was in fact of shorter duration than other postwar recessions, 
with the possible exception of the 1973–75 episode, which had a faster 
recovery. Employers may have expected a short downturn, based on the 
expectation that world trade would recover quickly. We also hypothesize 
that employers expected the 2005–07 boom to be short-lived. We investi-
gate these possibilities using data on firms’ expectations and an analysis of 
the business press, before considering variants of the expectations-based 
hypotheses.
emPlOyer exPectatiOnS data. We make use of indexes of the current 
business situation and business expectations derived from surveys conducted 
by the Ifo Institute for Economic Research. Ifo surveys about 7,000 firms each 
month, asking whether the current situation in the firm is good, satisfactory, 
or poor, and whether the firm expects the next 6 months to be more favor-
able than, unchanged from, or less favorable than today. Ifo calculates the 
expectations “balance” as the difference between the percentage shares of 
positive and negative responses. These indexes are available for the whole 
German economy, and separately for manufacturing, construction, wholesale 
trade, and retail trade. There is no obvious way to deal with unification, and 
so we simply join the series (for most series there is no jump at unification).
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Figure 10 presents these two monthly series for the above four sectors, 
along with quarterly value added in the corresponding sector, normalized to 
equal 100 at the start of the 2005 boom. The top left panel shows that changes 
in value added in manufacturing are clearly reflected in both the Ifo series. 
The current situation generally tracks expectations fairly closely, with a lag. 
The trough for 6-month expectations in manufacturing was in December 2008, 
which was indeed about 6 months before the trough for the current situation 
series for manufacturing, although less than 6 months before the trough of 
value added in manufacturing in 2009Q1. We can say that employers were 
not surprised by the end of the recession, but without data on expectations 
further into the future than 6 months, we cannot tell what employers expected 
at the start of the recession, when layoff decisions had to be made.23
Examination of the preceding expansion proves more fruitful. As the 
boom began in 2005, the current situation and expectations in manufactur-
ing initially rose together, but then expectations ceased to rise and remained 
much lower than the current situation until the recession hit. The only prec-
edent for such a gap between the current situation and expectations is the 
unusual postunification boom, and the gap points to a lack of confidence 
on manufacturing employers’ part that dovetails with the econometric 
evidence found above. There is a hint of a similar pattern for construc-
tion (top right panel), but expectations track the current situation closely 
throughout for retail and wholesale trade (bottom panels).
We can use the expectations data to quantify the role of expectations in 
hiring in the 2005–07 expansion. We focus on expectations and employment 
for the aggregate economy, since we cannot track true total employment 
in manufacturing in the boom, which would include temporary workers. 
Expectations refer to a change in the firm’s fortunes, and because they 
fluctuate at high frequency, a 1-quarter-differenced regression, with expec-
tations themselves (EXP) in levels (converted to quarterly frequency by 
averaging), is the appropriate specification:24
( ) log log log10 0 1 2 3 2∆ ∆ ∆L wt t t t= + + + +−φ φ φ φGDP EXP ∆µ t .
As table 8 shows, φ3 is positive and highly statistically significant, and the 
inclusion of the EXP variable increases the R2 of the regression considerably.25
23. We attempted to use data from the IAB-Betriebspanel on expected employment a 
year ahead, but these data proved unreliable.
24. The expectations variable is neither differenced nor expressed in logs: expectations 
can have a zero value, and converting to an index involves arbitrariness.
25.  Surprisingly, the interactions of expectations with the other covariates have statistically 
insignificant coefficients, and so we do not include them.
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We next construct counterfactual expectations for the boom period based 
on the historical relationship between expectations and the current situation 
(CUR), to assess the extent to which pessimistic expectations dampened 
hiring. The fit is similar whether CUR enters in levels or in differences, 
and we construct counterfactual expectations for 2005Q3 onward using the 
coefficient from the following regression for the usual 1970–2003 period:
∆ ∆ ∆EXP CURt t t= + +ρ ρ ξ0 1 .
We estimate rˆ1 to be 0.61. The counterfactual expectations during the 
2003–05 boom are much higher than the actual expectations.
Table 9 summarizes the effect of the pessimistic expectations in the boom. 
Actual employment growth in the expansion was 3.7 log points. Estimating 
equation 9 without controlling for expectations leads to the inaccurate pre-
diction of a mere 1.4-log-point employment increase. Adding expectations 
to the specification significantly improves the accuracy of the prediction to 
a 3.2-log-point increase. The key is to know how much higher employment 
growth would have been predicted to be had expectations been higher: with 
counterfactual expectations, employment growth is predicted to be 4.1 log 
points. The difference between the last two estimates shows the role of 
Table 8. regressions estimating the role of expectations in employment adjustmenta
	 Dependent	variable:		
	 change	in	log	employment
Independent	variable	 8-1	 8-2
DGDP 0.170 0.163
 (0.047) (0.038)
D Labor costs per workerb (Dw) -0.038 -0.049
 (0.035) (0.031)
Expectations balancec EXPt-2  0.00013
  (0.00003)
Constant 0.0002 0.0014
 (0.0006) (0.0006)
R2 0.18 0.38
No. of observations 135 134
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. All variables are measured using quarterly, seasonally adjusted data for 1970–2003 and (except the 
expectations balance) are expressed in logarithms. Newey-West standard errors based on four lags are 
in parentheses.
b. Includes employer and employee social security payments and is adjusted for reimbursements related 
to short-time work.
c. Difference between the share of firms expecting business conditions to be better in 6 months and the 
share expecting them to be worse.
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expectations: if expectations had behaved in the boom as they had histori-
cally, instead of having been unusually pessimistic, employment growth 
would have been 0.9 log point higher. This confirms that employers hesitated 
to hire in the 2005–07 boom for lack of confidence that it would last and 
cognizant of the high firing costs in Germany; thus, when the recession they 
feared indeed arrived, they had less need to fire. The effect of this pessi-
mism is sufficiently large to account for 0.9/1.6 = 56 percent of the missing 
employment increase in the boom, and 0.9/3.9 = 23 percent of the missing 
employment decline in the downturn.
eVidence frOm the buSineSS PreSS. Our narrative characterizing the 
2005–07 expansion as one of pessimistic expectations and unexpectedly 
low (conditional) employment growth is corroborated by our own survey of 
business cycle reporting by the leading daily German business newspaper, 
Handelsblatt, for the period 2005–09. Reports in the first 2 years of the 
expansion were remarkably downbeat, despite the fact that GDP growth 
was robust and (unconditional) employment growth unusually positive. 
A string of bad showings of the Ifo index of the overall business climate 
(a geometric average of the two indicators discussed above, namely, the 
current situation and expectations indexes) established a relatively pessimistic 
outlook at the outset.26 The expansion was seen as driven by buoyant exports 
and not at all by internal demand (domestic investment and consumption). 
26. “Wolken am europäischen Konjunkturhimmel” (Clouds on the European business 
cycle horizon), February 22, 2005; “Ifo spricht von chronischer Schwäche” (Ifo [Institute] 
cites chronic weakness), February 28, 2005; “Weniger Jobs trotz hoher Gewinne” (Fewer 
jobs despite higher profits), March 24, 2005. Journalist Olaf Storbeck noted that despite 
the conditions for a healthy expansion, consumers and employers were not cooperating: 
“1,2,3,4 . . . Aufschwung!” (1,2,3,4 . . . Boom!), April 25, 2005, and “Reformvorsprung 
für Deutschland” (A jump ahead with reforms for Germany), September 9, 2005. All cita-
tions in this subsection are from Handelsblatt.
Table 9. role of expectations in employment in the 2005–08 expansiona
	 Log	points
Actual change in employment 3.7
Predicted change in employment
  Without expectations controls 1.4
  With expectations controls 3.2
  With counterfactual expectations 4.1
Effect of changed expectationsb 0.9
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Values are reported for the period 2005Q3–2008Q3. Predictions are based on the 1-quarter- 
differenced regressions reported in table 8.
b. “With counterfactual expectations” minus “With expectations controls.”
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A commonly held view was that consumers were holding back spending in 
light of a continuing string of layoffs and restructuring measures by large 
firms, despite significant declines in the unemployment rate in 2005 her-
alded by major policymakers.27
The mood was further depressed by a general expectation that taxes—
especially the value-added tax—would be increased after the elections 
in fall 2005. Household income was seen as dented by flat wages, the 
Hartz reforms, and increases in social security contributions and energy 
prices.28 An expansion of consumer demand is thought to have kicked in 
only after the summer of 2006, when Germany hosted the World Cup soccer 
championship.29 Yet this view is not supported by the data; from 2005Q1 
to 2006Q2, annualized real consumption growth averaged 0.5 percent, com-
pared with 0.3 percent over the following 6 quarters. Even in July 2006 
there was a perception that firms were not creating enough jobs despite 
a return to profitability and that the expansion would soon grind to a halt.30
By January 2007 the pessimistic mood had reversed completely, despite 
a 3 percent increase in the value-added tax which took effect that month. 
The first half of the year was characterized by remarkably positive news 
reporting, despite a perceived weak showing for the labor market.31 By 
summer 2007 the first signs were appearing that the slowdown in the 
United States had arrived in Germany, yet forecasts by the major economic 
research institutes warned of only modest spillovers, citing the effect of the 
reforms and shortages of skilled workers.32 Positive reports continued into 
the summer of 2008, and a survey of 500 managers of medium-size com-
panies revealed that 76 percent believed they would not be affected by the 
27. “Clement sieht Arbeitslosigkeit auf Zenit” ([Economics Minister Wolfgang] Clement 
sees unemployment at its peak), March 31, 2005.
28. “Wirtschaft nimmt Fahrt auf—Konsum bleibt Hemmschuh” (The economy is taking 
off—consumer spending remains the bottleneck), November 15, 2005.
29. “Der kleine Luxus” (Small luxury), August 4, 2006.
30. “Der Aufwartstrend stockt” (The upward trend is sputtering), June 20, 2006; 
“Konzerne bauen in Deutschland ab” (Corporations are retrenching in Germany), July 18, 
2006; “Die Jobwende bleibt aus” (The job turnaround isn’t materializing), July 18, 2006. 
As late as summer 2006, Chancellor Angela Merkel criticized a series of high-profile lay-
offs by Allianz and Volkswagen: “Merkel ermahnt die Unternehmen” (Merkel admonishes 
businesses [for continuing layoffs]), August 24, 2006.
31. See “Experten streiten über Aufschwung am Arbeitsmarkt” (Experts disagree over 
the boom for the labor market), August 2, 2007.
32. “Herbstgutachten Analyse: Neue Besen kehren gut” (Analysis of the fall [economic] 
forecasts: New brooms sweep well), October 17, 2007. The article “Ohne die USA mutig 
voraus” (Bravely forward without the United States), December 30, 2007, describes a strong 
positive sentiment that despite problems in the United States, export demand would continue 
and that firms were unlikely to lay off workers, given difficulties finding skilled workers.
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ensuing economic crisis.33 By July 2008, however, the Ifo composite index 
had turned sharply downward, and by August the judgment was unanimous 
that the boom was over.34
Toward the end of the phase of negative growth (2008Q1–2009Q1), 
news reports began to suggest that employers were reluctant to fire work-
ers, instead using short-time work and reducing working time balances and 
earned vacation time to protect core workers.35 By July 2009, rising order 
books and recovery of the world economy contributed to a general recovery, 
which was mirrored in consumer optimism.36 By the end of 2009, the consen-
sus view was that the recession was over.
IV.F.  Competing and Complementary Explanations  
of the Labor Market Miracle
We can explain about 60 percent of the labor market miracle in Germany 
with wage moderation and slow employment growth in the previous boom. 
Only about half of the latter can be attributed to pessimistic employer 
expectations, however. Christine Franz and Steffen Lehndorff (2010) hypoth-
esize that layoffs were low in the recession because of a lack of hiring in the 
expansion, as working time accounts reduced the long-run marginal cost 
of an extra hour per worker, leading to a permanent increase in hours per 
worker at the expense of employment.37 To assess the possible magnitude 
of this effect, we compute difference-in-differences comparing changes in 
hours per worker in 1996–2004, when they were still falling rapidly, 
and 2004–07, when they leveled out. Before 1996, reductions in hours 
per worker were associated with reductions in usual hours for full-time 
workers and appear to reflect the success of unions in translating increased 
33. “Deutsche Wirtschaft überraschend stark” (German economy is surprisingly strong), 
May 15, 2008; “Wirtschaft hat vielversprechend Pläne” (Promising outlook for the economy), 
June 4, 2008; “Finanzkrise? Kein Thema” (Financial crisis? Not an issue), June 7, 2008.
34. See “Der Aufschwung ist vorbei” (The boom is over), August 14, 2008, which 
details the negative GDP growth results for the second quarter; “Ifo: ‘Abwärtstrend mit 
Riesenschritten’” (Ifo: Negative trend with giant steps), September 24, 2008.
35. In February, Handelsblatt reported that burgeoning working time account balances 
and administrative extension of short-time work had made machine tool producers better 
prepared to deal with the crisis in comparison with previous recessions: “Erfahrene Zyklikler” 
(Experienced ‘cyclists’), February 11, 2009. In particular, mention is made of businesses 
holding onto trained personnel as long as possible; see “Trotz Krise gibt es sie—die Jobwunder” 
(Despite the crisis—there are job miracles), March 4, 2009.
36. “Die Industrie meldet sich zurück” (Industry is back), July 7, 2009; “Deutsche 
Tugend” (German virtue), September 2, 2009; “Deutsches Mini-Jobwunder macht Hoff-
nung” (German mini-job miracle creates hope), October 15, 2009. For a note on consumer 
sentiment, see “Verkehrte Welt” (Topsy-turvy world), October 8, 2009.
37. In terms of the model in section IV.A, this is a decrease in the parameter hWq.
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wealth into increased leisure.38 Table 10 shows that the regime change 
between 1996–2004 and 2004–07 was driven by a slowing increase in the 
share of workers working part-time and rising standard weekly hours. Even 
in the latter period, chosen so as to maximize the buildup of working time 
accounts in the expansion, we find that their overall contribution appears 
small. However, estimates of working time accounts may not be reliable, 
especially when standard weekly hours are changing, and so part of the 
low hiring in the expansion could well be due to a permanent shift in hours 
conditional on GDP and labor costs.
The model presented at the beginning of this section would attribute 
the remaining 40 percent of the miracle to a regime shift, that is, changing 
model parameters that would increase the quasi-fixity of labor. We have 
focused on working time accounts and the disincentives they create for 
layoffs, yet a number of alternative explanations can also be explored in light 
of our empirical findings and the predictions of the model. An explanation 
frequently cited for the low employment growth in the 2005–07 expan-
sion is a higher incidence of skilled worker “shortages” than in previous 
expansions, or a reluctance to lay off workers when the recession arrived, 
fearing difficulties in rehiring them in the recovery.39 Although firms report-
ing shortages in the boom were not less likely to lay off in the recession 
Table 10. Sources of changes in hours per Worker, 1996–2007a
	 Change	per	year	(hours)	
Difference	in
Source	of	change	 1996–2004	 2004–07	 differences	(hours)b
Short-time work 0.3 0.5 0.2
Standard weekly hours -2.0 3.3 5.3
Overtime -1.0 -0.8 0.2
Part-time share -13.4 -7.1 6.3
Working time accounts -0.1 1.2 1.3
Calendar effectc 1.1 -3.6 -4.7
Sick days 2.8 1.0 -1.8
Second jobs 1.0 1.2 0.2
Vacation days 2.1 0.6 -1.5
  Sum: annual hours per worker -9.3 -3.6 5.7
Source: IAB Working Time Calculation and authors’ calculations.
a. Annual data.
b. Second column minus first column.
c. Reflects the different numbers of working days across years.
38. See Hunt (1998), Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005), and Burda, Hamermesh, 
and Weil (2008).
39. Sachverständigenrat (2010), Schaz and Spitznagel (2010), and Schütt (2010). In the 
business press, this factor was mentioned frequently after the onset of the Great Recession.
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(Klinger and others 2011), and although the vacancies-to-employment ratio 
and the share of firms reporting shortages were similar in the 2005–07 
expansion and in its predecessor (Gartner and Klinger 2010), it is possible that 
increasing specialization of the workforce and slow labor force growth have 
made firms more reluctant to part with their skilled workers in recessions.40
An explanation that competes with pessimistic employer expectations is 
that output-constrained firms experienced a positive productivity shock at the 
beginning of the expansion.41 A priori, this would seem less plausible for 
Germany, an open economy facing a competitive international market. Under 
these conditions, a productivity shock would more likely be represented as a 
fall, not a rise, in prices. In any case, comparison of labor productivity (output 
per hour) across expansions shows that whereas output increased in 2005–07 
by an amount to similar to that in the previous three booms, labor productiv-
ity rose by not much more than half of the corresponding value. There is no 
evidence that this mechanism was responsible for the sluggish expansion.42
V.  Conclusion
Like the United States, Germany suffered its worst postwar recession in 
2008–09. Yet employment barely fell and unemployment hardly rose. 
Germany generally accommodates reductions in labor demand more along 
the intensive margin than does the United States, and we have shown that the 
large reductions in hours per worker in Germany were largely consistent with 
the magnitude of the recession and recent wage moderation. The lack of a 
decline in employment was a historical anomaly, however. One partial expla-
nation for the “labor market miracle” is pessimistic expectations leading to 
low hiring in the previous expansion, with the result that fewer workers were 
laid off when the recession arrived. Weak employment growth in the boom 
accounts for 41 percent of the missing employment decline in the recession. 
Our account is thus broadly consistent with the narrative in the business press.
Although part of Germany’s labor market response to the Great Recession 
is directly related to expectations, another component is related to changes 
in labor market institutions since the mid-1990s. The increased use of pri-
vately negotiated working time accounts appears to have cheapened private 
40. In terms of the model in section IV.A, this would correspond to an increase in the 
parameter c.
41.  A firm that cannot sell more of its output at the given price will react to an exogenous 
increase in productivity by cutting labor (or hiring less).
42. Using the recessions defined in table 3, output increased in the 2005–07 boom by 
6.2 log points (versus 6.6 log points in the three previous recessions), but output per hour 
increased by only 3.8 log points (6.8 log points in the three previous recessions).
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adjustment along the intensive margin and substituted for the more tradi-
tional government short-time work—a potentially interesting lesson for the 
United States. However, incentives inherent in the working time accounts, 
which allow employers to avoid the overtime premium in good times, are 
likely to have reduced layoffs in the recession. For any desired change in 
total hours, lower sensitivity of costs of hours per worker also increased the 
effective cost of layoffs. Thus, while the change in hours per worker in 
the recession was not unusual, the unexpected development was the larger 
number of workers able to retain their job and experience this decline in 
hours per worker.
Although it may be tempting to consider working time accounts for 
the United States, it is important to be circumspect when comparing labor 
markets across countries. Their functioning is conditioned by the system of 
labor relations and their interaction with the whole spectrum of labor market 
institutions. It is noteworthy that working time accounts in Germany are more 
prevalent in large firms, which have more resources to manage the complex 
task of human resources planning, and which are overseen by works councils.
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Comment By
mICHAeL W. L. eLSBy1    Michael Burda and Jennifer Hunt have pro-
duced a very interesting and informative exploration of the Great Reces-
sion  and  its  propagation  through  the German  labor market.  Their  paper 
displays a deep knowledge of the institutional context in which the reces-
sion evolved, and it brings to bear a strikingly broad range of data given the 
almost real-time nature of the analysis.
The puzzle  that Burda and Hunt  address  is  the  following:  although 
German GDP and labor productivity fell precipitously during the reces-
sion, and hours per worker fell by as much as one would expect  from 
past behavior, employment barely fell at all. That last fact is remarkable 
relative to both the recent experience of the United States and, as Burda 
and Hunt show, the cyclical behavior of German employment in previ-
ous recessions.
At  the risk of oversimplification: Burda and Hunt consider  two broad 
classes of explanation. The first  is real wage flexibility. If  the decline in 
labor demand that accompanied the recession led to significant wage mod-
eration, then employment did not need to fall. The second is the possibility 
that profound labor hoarding prevented the steep decline in contempora-
neous labor productivity from translating into a commensurate decline in 
firms’ labor demand.
The emphasis of the paper is on the second of these two explanations. In 
particular, Burda and Hunt draw attention to two sources of labor hoarding 
that, they argue, may have had an important bearing on Germany’s experi-
ence in the Great Recession. First, they suggest that surpluses in working 
1.  I am very grateful to Heiko Stüber for valuable discussions and for his help and advice 
with  the Beschäftigten-Historik microdata  for Germany. Thanks also  to Rudi Bachmann, 
Steffen Elstner, and Eric Sims for sharing their data.
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time accounts, accumulated in the boom that preceded the recession, may 
have been perceived by firms as a firing cost during the recession. Second, 
they contend that lackluster expectations in the boom, together with opti-
mistic expectations of a short recession, moderated firms’ incentives to lay 
off workers in the recession.
I will touch on a number of questions that arise in my mind that challenge 
the conclusion that labor hoarding was at the heart of the German labor 
market puzzle in the Great Recession. On some of these questions, it will 
turn out that available data allow me to prove myself wrong. On others, 
however, the data do provide some suggestive, although not conclusive, 
evidence that questions the significance of labor hoarding.
My first question relates to real wage flexibility. Burda and Hunt suggest 
that aggregate measures of labor cost per hour show little evidence of wage 
moderation  during  the  recession. A  long  and  distinguished  literature  on 
estimating real wage cyclicality, however, argues that such aggregate mea-
sures are potentially misleading. Reductions in labor input that accompany 
recessions are  typically borne disproportionately by  the  low skilled, and 
this compositional shift biases one toward finding little wage moderation 
in aggregate data in times of recession. This countercyclical composition 
bias has been  shown  to be  substantial  in data  for  the United States:  see 
Gary Solon, Robert Barsky, and Jonathan Parker (1994) and the references 
cited therein.
As Solon, Barsky, and Parker demonstrate, a sense of the magnitude of 
this composition bias can be obtained by looking at changes in individual 
real wages across time using longitudinal microdata. By happy coincidence, 
I was able to access a particularly rich source of such data from German 
social security records. The Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH) is the employee 
history file of the Institute for Employment Research (Institut für Arbeits-
markt- und Berufsforschung, or IAB) of the German Federal Employment 
Agency. It includes the total population gainfully employed and covered 
by the social security system.2 The data include a measure of the daily 
earnings of workers employed on June 30 of each year from 1977 to 2009.3 
The results reported in what follows are based on a 10 percent sample of 
full-time workers aged 16 to 65.
2.  Not covered are self-employed workers, family workers assisting in the operation of 
a family business, civil servants, and regular students. The earnings data are right censored 
at  the  contribution  assessment  ceiling. Only  noncensored  earnings  spells  are  used  in my 
analysis. 
3.  A  drawback  of  the  data  is  that  they  do  not  include  a measure  of workers’  hours. 
Consequently, the results reported could reflect cyclicality in full-time workers’ daily hours 
worked.
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These data allow one to check whether a concern about composition bias 
is founded in aggregate German data. The answer turns out to be yes and 
no. On the one hand, over the whole sample period, adjusting for cyclical 
changes in the composition of labor input raises substantially the estimated 
cyclicality of real wages in Germany. The estimated semielasticity of real 
daily  earnings  with  respect  to  the  unemployment  rate  using  unadjusted 
data is -0.34 (with a standard error of 0.33), compared with an estimate 
of -0.90  (with  a  standard  error  of  0.24)  using  the  composition-adjusted 
data.4 In other words, adjusting for composition nearly triples the estimated 
cyclicality of real daily earnings and suggests that a 1-percentage-point rise 
in the unemployment rate is associated with a 0.9 percent decline in real 
daily earnings. This semielasticity of close to 1 is strikingly close to the 
estimates found in the U.S. literature (see Solon, Barsky, and Parker 1994).
On the other hand, closer inspection of the estimates reveals little evi-
dence of pervasive wage moderation during  the recent recession in Ger-
many,  even  in  composition-adjusted  estimates  of  the  cyclicality  of  real 
wages. To show this, my figure 1 plots estimates of composition-adjusted 
real wage growth together with the change in the unemployment rate for 
each year in the BeH sample from 1977 to 2009. Reflecting the point esti-
mates noted above, the two series clearly approximate mirror images of one 
another over the majority of the sample period. Despite this, composition-
adjusted growth in real daily earnings exhibits no sharp decline during the 
recent recession.
My second reaction to Burda and Hunt’s analysis is that although they 
do an admirable job of documenting and interpreting the behavior of labor 
market stocks, they do not analyze worker flows during the recession. In 
particular, I want to draw attention to the behavior of the exit rate from 
unemployment in Germany in recent years, which exhibits some curious 
properties.
4.  These estimates are derived using the method suggested by Solon, Barsky, and Parker 
(1994). The first estimate  (which  is contaminated by cyclical changes  in  the composition 
of the workforce) is the outcome of a simple least squares regression of aggregate log real 
daily earnings for each year in the sample on the time series of the change in the unemploy-
ment  rate,  together with a  linear  time  trend. The second estimate adjusts  for composition 
using a two-step procedure. In the first stage, the change in an individual worker’s log real 
daily earnings is regressed on a set of dummy variables for each year of the sample, as well 
as the worker’s age. In the second stage, a simple least squares regression of the estimated 
year effects on the change in the unemployment rate and a linear time trend is performed. 
Because of a large outlier in the growth of average log real daily wages in 1991–92, I omit 
that observation in constructing both the unadjusted and the adjusted estimates.
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Since George Perry’s seminal 1972 Brookings Paper, economists have 
known that it  is possible to infer unemployment flows from the duration 
structure of unemployment. At the time of this writing, data on unemploy-
ment by duration for Germany were available from Eurostat annually from 
1998 to 2004, and quarterly thereafter until the third quarter of 2010. These 
data therefore cover much of the recent recessionary period.
My figure 2 plots the time series of the unemployment rate together with 
the exit rate inferred from data on unemployment by duration in Germany.5 
As in the United States and many other developed economies, it is clear that 
the exit rate moves procyclically in Germany. A striking feature of these 
series, however, is that the exit rate began rising as early as 2004, about a 
year and a half before German unemployment eventually began declining 
Source: IAB employee history file (Beschäftigten-Historik), 1977–2009. 
a. Earnings are noncensored daily earnings on June 30 of each year, estimated from a 10 percent 
sample of full-time employees aged 16 to 65 covered by social security and deflated by the Bundesbank 
consumer price index.
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Figure 1. Composition-Adjusted Real Daily Earnings Growth and Changes in the 
Unemployment Rate, Germany, 1977–2009
5.  The unemployment exit rate is computed as follows. First, the probability of exiting 
unemployment within a quarter is calculated as Ft = 1 - [(Ut+1 - U<3m)/Ut], where Ut denotes 
the total number of unemployed workers, and Ut<3m the number unemployed for less than 
3 months, in quarter t. This is then converted into a monthly unemployment exit hazard, 
ft = ln(1 - Ft)/3.
t+1
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at the end of 2005 during the boom that preceded the recent recession. This 
behavior of the exit rate is anomalous: in the majority of developed econo-
mies, unemployment exit rates are a lagging indicator, typically falling for 
some time after recessions are deemed to have ended (see Elsby, Hobijn, 
and  S¸ahin 2008).
An intriguing aspect of this anomalous turnaround in the exit rate in the 
mid-2000s is that it coincided with a period of substantial German labor 
market reforms. A notable feature of these reforms was a significant reduc-
tion in unemployment benefit duration. Although this is not hard evidence, 
it  is suggestive  that  the reforms may have had some influence on recent 
trends in the German labor market. That the recent buoyancy of German 
employment may  in part be  traced  to persistent  effects of  these  reforms 
therefore seems a possibility worthy of consideration.
A second striking feature of figure 2 is the behavior of the exit rate 
during the recent recession. In particular, one can see that an important 
reason why unemployment did not rise during the recession in Germany is 
that, after a small initial contraction, unemployed workers left the jobless 
pool at increasing rates. This casts a different hue on the message of the 
Source: Eurostat. 
a. Inferred from unemployment by duration. Data are plotted annually from 1998 through 2005 and as 
a 4-quarter moving average of quarterly data thereafter.
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paper, which speaks of  the “missing job losses” in the recession in Ger-
many. Rather, it seems possible that there might simply have been buoyant 
hiring throughout the recession. (I am careful to use the word “possible” 
because elevated exit rates do not necessarily imply elevated rates of hir-
ing. It might be that the unemployed increasingly have flowed out of the 
labor force, although whether this is so cannot be gleaned from the dura-
tion  structure  of  unemployment.) To  the  extent  that  these  buoyant  rates 
of exit from unemployment are indicative of the hiring behavior of firms, 
this poses a challenge to the view that increased labor hoarding muted the 
response of employment: labor hoarding would imply that firms neither fire 
nor hire in response to an adverse shock.
An important component of Burda and Hunt’s explanation for the lim-
ited decline in German employment in the recession is the role of flexible 
working time accounts. The idea is that firms accumulated large surpluses 
in these accounts during the preceding boom and that these in turn acted 
as a liability when the recession came around. It was unclear to me, how-
ever, that simple economics would justify interpreting accumulated work-
ing time surpluses as a firing cost. For this to be the case, it would require 
that firms were viewing increases in hours during the boom as if they were 
getting them for free. In contrast, simple economics would argue that the 
shadow price of labor is unchanged by the introduction of flexible work-
ing time: firms that increased hours during the boom should have realized 
that there was a marginal cost of doing so. It is possible that German firms 
did  not  realize  this,  but  it  does  highlight  an  alternative  interpretation of 
these working time accounts, namely, as a means for firms to adjust hours 
precisely when it is profitable for them to do so, without altering the effec-
tive price of labor. Far from being an impediment to layoffs, working time 
accounts  under  this  interpretation would  act  as  a  boon  to  labor  demand 
and hiring, as  they allow firms to  time increases  in  labor  input  to match 
increases in their productivity or product demand.
The second prong of Burda and Hunt’s story for why labor hoarding is 
prominent in explaining the German employment puzzle is that manufac-
turing employers lacked confidence during the boom preceding the reces-
sion, causing them to be cautious in hiring workers during the boom and 
obviating  the need to  lay off many workers when the recession came. It 
is worth noting that a few aspects of the data discussed above jar with the 
notion of widespread underconfidence before the recession. For example, 
the rise in unemployment exit rates during the boom in figure 2 may have 
been  accounted  for  by  robust  hiring,  something  not  usually  associated 
with weak confidence. Similarly, it is hard to square the underconfidence 
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hypothesis  with  the  rapid  accumulation  of  surpluses  in  working  time 
accounts documented by Burda and Hunt, especially if one interprets them 
as increasing firing costs in the recession. If firms were cautious during the 
boom, why would they accumulate such large surpluses in the knowledge 
that they would act as a liability in the upcoming recession that they were 
worried about?
Two further  issues come  to mind. First, Burda and Hunt  infer under-
confidence among manufacturing employers in the boom from a discrep-
ancy that emerged over the period 2005–07 between firms’ reports of the 
contemporaneous  business  climate  and  their  reported  expectations  for 
6 months ahead. A concern with this comparison is that the former come 
from a question about levels (is the current situation “good, satisfactory or 
poor?”) whereas  the  latter come from a question about changes  (do you 
expect the next 6 months to be “more favorable, unchanged or less favor-
able?”). Thus, it is not clear that the deviation between the reported cur-
rent level of activity and expected future growth in activity is necessarily 
indicative of lackluster confidence: for example, if expected growth were 
positive, that would be consistent with a rising level in the other series.
Second, the notion of underconfidence that Burda and Hunt emphasize 
is typically absent in simple models of labor hoarding, since these models 
often invoke rational expectations. One could argue, however, that the ana-
logue of underconfidence in these models is the uncertainty that firms face 
about future productivity and demand conditions. If hiring and firing deci-
sions are costly to reverse, increases in uncertainty lead to a wait-and-see 
effect whereby firms are more reluctant to hire and fire (Bloom 2009). So 
perhaps another way of getting a sense of firms’ confidence in Germany in 
recent years is to consider measures of uncertainty.
One can use data on business expectations to get a sense of firms’ uncer-
tainty during the recession. Figure 3 plots a measure of uncertainty con-
structed  by Ruediger  Bachmann,  Steffen  Elstner,  and  Eric  Sims  (2010) 
from microdata  from  the  Ifo  Institute. This measure  is  computed  as  the 
cross-sectional standard deviation of responses to a question about whether 
the firm expects its domestic production to increase or decrease over the 
next quarter.
Figure 3 suggests that, measured in this way, uncertainty has risen in all 
recessions since 1980 in Germany, including the recent one. Particularly 
interesting for the question at hand, figure 3 shows that the rise in uncer-
tainty surrounding the recent recession does not seem any greater than that 
witnessed in past downturns in Germany. Yet unemployment barely rose 
this time around, despite having risen substantially in the past. The impli-
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cation of figure 3, then, is that uncertainty-driven labor hoarding is not a 
plausible candidate for the recent German employment puzzle.
To  summarize,  Burda  and Hunt  have  produced  an  interesting,  infor-
mative,  and  thought-provoking  analysis  of  the puzzle of  robust German 
employment  during  the  recent  recession.  Their  analysis  displays  both  a 
deep  institutional knowledge and a  remarkably detailed  real-time analy-
sis of a constellation of labor market outcomes in the recession. My own 
brief glimpse at the German data broadly supports their view that pervasive 
wage moderation was not at the root of the German employment puzzle. 
What is less clear to me is whether the view that labor hoarding was at the 
core of the puzzle is consistent with all aspects of the available evidence.
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Comment By
JoHn HALtIWAnGeR    This  paper  by  Michael  Burda  and  Jennifer 
Hunt is an interesting and informative analysis of the German labor market 
in  the Great Recession. Even  though Germany  suffered  about  the  same 
proportional decline in GDP as the United States, it experienced a much 
smaller percentage decline in employment. Conventional wisdom (at least 
in the popular press) is that this is due to German labor market institutions 
that promote variation in hours per worker rather than in employment. Burda 
and Hunt show forcefully  that  the conventional wisdom is  incorrect:  the 
responsiveness of hours per worker in the Great Recession in Germany was 
not different (taking into account the severity of the recession) from that in 
past recessions. However, in those recessions employment declined much 
more than it did in the Great Recession.
In  assembling  this  convincing  evidence,  the  authors  provide  a  rich 
and  informative  description  of  the  various  programs  for  encouraging 
variation in hours per worker in Germany. They note, as have others in 
the literature, that Germany exhibits greater cyclical variation in hours 
per worker than the United States and that this is likely due to these pro-
grams. They also show that the mix of programs has changed over time: 
for example, working time accounts have become much more important. 
But their growing importance mostly acted as a substitute for short-time 
work programs.  In  addition, Burda  and Hunt  speculate  that  the work-
ing time accounts create disincentives for laying off workers. However, 
they are not able to test for that effect directly, given the limitations of 
the data.
The authors’ findings imply that other factors must account for the mod-
est  decline  in  employment  that  accompanied  the  large decline  in output 
in Germany  in  the Great Recession. Their  leading  candidate  hypothesis 
is associated with issues of confidence and expectations. They argue that 
in  the 2005–07 boom, German firms were more  cautious  in  their  hiring 
COMMENTS and DISCUSSION 329
than they had been in previous booms (that is, they had overly pessimistic 
expectations), and therefore they did not reduce employment as much in 
the Great Recession as they would have typically, because they were rela-
tively “lean and mean” going into the recession.
The authors offer two types of related evidence in support of this hypoth-
esis.  First,  they  show  that  the  forecast  error  patterns  of  a  simple model 
relating employment to output, wages, and other factors are consistent with 
this story. Second, they acquire data on expectations and show that, at least 
for manufacturing, expectations  in  the 2005–07 boom were more out of 
line with what subsequently happened than they had been in earlier peri-
ods. They use the larger-than-usual discrepancy in the relationship between 
current  and  expected  conditions  in  the  boom  to  generate what  they  call 
counterfactual expectations. They then calculate that  these confidence or 
expectational  factors account  for 56 percent of  the missing employment 
increase in the boom and 23 percent of the missing employment decline in 
the downturn.
Is this evidence for the main hypothesis convincing? I would argue that 
it is suggestive but hardly compelling. If their hypothesis is correct, there 
should be similar patterns of change in other factors of production—capi-
tal in particular—over the cycle. Investment in fixed plant and equipment 
is among  the most volatile components of GDP, and  the  responsiveness 
of investment is closely tied to uncertainty, confidence, and expectations. 
Adjustment costs for capital are larger and involve greater irreversibilities 
than for labor.
An examination of the patterns of aggregate investment in Germany over 
this period shows a robust increase in the 2005–07 boom and a substantial 
decline in the Great Recession. Although further analysis is needed, these 
fluctuations do not look different from those in earlier cyclical episodes. If 
that is the case, then for the authors’ story to make sense, it must be that 
confidence and expectational factors affected only employment variation 
and not investment, which seems implausible.
If confidence and expectational factors do not account for the puzzle, what 
does? The authors also provide suggestive evidence that wage moderation 
contributed to mitigating the decline in employment. The evidence is based 
on noting that since 2001, wage growth in Germany has moderated some-
what. Using a counterfactual, the authors argue that this moderation might 
account for as much as 20 percent of the missing employment decline in 
the Great Recession. Although the authors include this point in their sum-
mary of the factors that may be at work, they also note that this explanation 
is not  fully satisfactory, since  it  then  introduces another puzzle, namely, 
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why in the face of such wage moderation German firms did not increase 
employment more in the 2005–07 boom.
The authors also hint at other possibly important factors that warrant 
further investigation, in particular the labor market reforms that occurred 
during 2003–05. These reforms included changes in unemployment bene-
fits, increased job search assistance for the unemployed, changes in layoff 
rules, and significant deregulation of the temporary agency sector.
All of these factors in principle contributed to greater labor market flex-
ibility. It might be thought that this greater flexibility would yield greater 
aggregate fluctuations in employment, but this need not follow. Greater 
labor market flexibility enables workers to move more readily from declin-
ing firms to expanding firms. Thus, it can reduce the aggregate costs of the 
ongoing restructuring and reallocation that are inherently part of market 
economies.
What is known about the nature and pace of restructuring and realloca-
tion in Germany? Reunification obviously generated an enormous amount 
of both in the 1990s. However, even when this is taken into account, the 
evidence shows that Germany did not have as rapid a pace of job creation 
and destruction as the United States over 1990–2005.1 Still, it may be that 
the labor market reforms of 2003–05 changed both the nature and the pace 
of restructuring and reallocation in Germany.
Unfortunately, data on  the pace of  job creation and destruction and 
accompanying  worker  flows  such  as  hires,  layoffs,  and  quits  are  not 
readily  available  for Germany  for  the  recent  period. But  since  the U.S. 
employment decline is so large and so different from that in Germany, it 
is instructive to briefly review the patterns of worker and job flows for the 
United States over  this same period (what follows is drawn from Davis, 
Faberman, and Haltiwanger 2011).  In  the Great Recession in  the United 
States, job destruction and layoffs exhibited a spike in late 2008 and early 
2009, a pattern similar  to  that observed in previous recessions (although 
larger because of the severity of the downturn). What is different from the 
earlier  recessions  is  the  behavior  of  creation  and  hiring. Both  fell more 
than usual and have been much slower to recover than in any other cycli-
cal downturn since 1980. In that respect, an important reason for the large 
and persistent employment decline  in  the United States  is  the especially 
pronounced decoupling of the timing of job creation and job destruction.
1.  Here I am comparing statistics provided to me by Stefan Bender from the IAB for 
the German private sector with U.S. Business Dynamic Statistics available from the U.S. 
Census Bureau.
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The patterns for the United States raise several questions for Germany. 
For one, in both the 2005–07 boom and the 2008–09 recession, what are 
the margins of adjustment in terms of job creation, job destruction, hires, 
layoffs, and quits? Comparing the patterns in the two countries before 2005 
shows  that  job creation  is more cyclically volatile  in Germany, whereas 
job  destruction  is more  cyclically  volatile  in  the United States. Thus,  it 
may be that the dampened volatility of employment over the recent boom 
and recession has more to do with dampened job creation than dampened 
job destruction. If so, this would suggest focusing more on why job cre-
ation and hiring became less volatile in Germany (rather than on why job 
destruction  and  layoffs  became  less  volatile, which  is  the  approach  that 
Burda and Hunt take). All of this is, of course, highly speculative, but the 
point is that without this information it is going to be difficult to understand 
this period well.
Even though the authors do not find that variation in hours per worker 
accounts for the German miracle, they suggest that policies that encourage 
such variation, like those in Germany, might be of interest for the United 
States  to reduce the cyclical volatility of employment. There are a num-
ber of open questions as to whether this is a reasonable recommendation. 
First, one would need to establish that such incentives for varying hours per 
worker overcome some market imperfection or market failure. Second, one 
would need to consider the distortions introduced by such policies.
Underlying this discussion are core questions about the nature of reces-
sions. A firm might optimally use hours per worker as the margin of adjust-
ment  in  response  to  a  temporary  negative  profitability  shock,  given  the 
adjustment (hiring and firing) costs of changing employment. However, in 
response to a permanent (or more persistent) profit shock, a firm might opti-
mally choose to reduce its workforce rather than reduce hours per worker, 
both because of fixed components of nonwage compensation and because of 
production efficiencies. The perspective of the traditional representative-agent 
macro model is that recessions reflect transitory shocks to the representa-
tive firm and worker. Thus, it might seem sensible to encourage adjustment 
along the hours-per-worker margin (although if that is jointly optimal for 
the firm and the worker, there remains the question of why the government 
needs to intervene). But the problem with this viewpoint is that it ignores 
the empirical evidence that shows incredibly heterogeneous dynamics of 
firms and workers over the cycle. Even though recessions are transitory in 
the aggregate, many of the employment reductions at the firm level, and 
therefore job losses at the worker level, are permanent. Individual sectors 
and the overall economy do recover from recessions, but more often than 
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not the recovery reflects the entry and expansion of different firms than 
those that contracted. Viewed from this perspective, providing incentives 
for firms to cut hours per worker rather  than cut workers may not make 
sense if the firm is unprofitable and the workers would be (ultimately) bet-
ter off separating  to find better opportunities. Of course,  this  is an over-
simplification: even when firm and worker heterogeneity are  taken  fully 
into account, it may be that the distortions in the reallocation dynamics in 
recessions are sufficient that it is optimal to pursue a variety of counter-
cyclical policies.
Another way of making these points is to note that, according to both 
theory and evidence, policies that discourage employment adjustment may 
have adverse consequences on productivity. This point is elegantly demon-
strated  theoretically  by  Hugo  Hopenhayn  and  Richard  Rogerson  (1992), 
among others. The empirical evidence shows that the rapid pace of realloca-
tion in market economies, such as both the United States and Germany, is 
productivity enhancing (see Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta 2009 for 
a survey of the cross-country evidence). That is, reallocation largely reflects 
resources being moved away from less productive to more productive firms. 
Moreover,  the evidence shows  that  the reallocation  induced by recessions 
also tends to be productivity enhancing. This, of course, neglects the high 
cost of  recessions  in  terms of  lost output and employment, but  it  remains 
relevant that, conditional on a recession happening, the reallocation that is 
induced is ultimately productivity enhancing. The implication of this discus-
sion is that slowing down the pace of reallocation, even in recessions, may 
have adverse consequences on productivity. With respect to the most recent 
downturn in Germany, the implication may be that what was a miracle in 
terms of employment was also a problem in terms of productivity. It is clear 
that Germany exhibited a substantial short-run decline in productivity. But 
there may also have been medium- and longer-term adverse consequences on 
productivity if the miracle was associated with an inhibition of productivity-
enhancing reallocation.
To sum up,  I am more persuaded by what  the authors show does not 
account for the German miracle than I am by what they claim does account 
for it. I suspect that the puzzle in this episode will not be fully solved with-
out more data showing the patterns of capital adjustment as well as the pat-
terns of worker and job flows, and how they compare with previous cycles. 
In  like  fashion,  understanding  such worker  and  job flow dynamics over 
the cycle will prove critical  to understanding the positive and normative 
aspects of policies that provide incentives for adjusting hours per worker 
relative to adjusting employment over the cycle.
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GeneRAL DISCUSSIon  Betsey Stevenson understood working time 
corridors to be about wage smoothing rather than a way of avoiding separa-
tion costs. During the boom, workers should have been paid overtime rates 
for their extra hours. Instead, firms had the option of not paying overtime 
but  rather shifting work hours  to periods when  there was more demand. 
Stevenson  thought  it worth  thinking  about whether  the  benefits  of  such 
smoothing are exceeded by the costs of delaying reallocation. Further, 
she noted, in both German and U.S. policy circles, short-time accounts 
are widely believed to explain the difference between the two countries. It 
would be worthwhile to have a broader discussion about where that belief 
comes from and whether it is valid.
Robert Hall wondered how Germany could produce extra output without 
any extra labor. In the authors’ story, faced with increased demand for their 
output, employers were thinking that the strong demand would not last and 
somehow met  that  demand with  their  existing workforce  rather  than by 
adding workers. In the U.S. setting that would not be possible because the 
workforce is working at full throttle all the time. In Germany there must 
have been a tremendous amount of slack during the boom that made it 
possible to increase output sharply without additional workers.
David Romer noted that when output rises for a given level of employ-
ment, usually it means that something good has happened, perhaps in terms 
of technology, that allows for increased efficiency. He wondered how to 
distinguish between that kind of story and the authors’ story about cautious 
firms.  In  the authors’  time series,  the  jump in  the deviation of predicted 
from actual employment took place right at the beginning of the boom. It 
could be that firms were very cautious at this point and kept employment low, 
and somehow got more output from that smaller workforce in the following 
years. Then, when the recession came, they did not need to cut employment. 
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But an alternative story would be that something positive happened in terms 
of their ability to produce output from given inputs. 
Donald Kohn raised the question of whether Germany’s  labor market 
reforms played an important role in firms’ hesitancy to hire. Following up 
on Romer’s comment, he suggested that the good thing that happened at 
the beginning of the boom was that firms found they could get more output 
from their existing workforce because they now had more flexibility to 
use workers in more efficient ways. On that basis he wondered what the 
decline in productivity in Germany over the last two years implied about 
the reforms: did they really raise productivity, or did they merely push 
productivity from one part of the cycle to another?
Richard Cooper observed that one important stylized difference between 
the German and the U.S. economy is that the former depends much more 
on exports and the latter much more on consumption. The question then is 
whether most of the drop in GDP in the recent recession in Germany was 
actually a drop in export demand compared with the United States, especially 
given very stable consumption demand in Germany. 
Justin  Wolfers  highlighted  the  relevance  of  Germany’s  recession 
experience for recent proposals in the United States to adopt work sharing. 
Normal short time or work sharing does not seem to have had a big effect 
in Germany, but that was because another institution, working time corridors, 
effectively did the work that work sharing would normally do. Thus, the fact 
that work sharing was not a major factor in Germany did not argue against 
the claim that work sharing might be important in the United States.
Wolfers also asked whether more evidence could be provided for  the 
causal link between two very important facts that emerged from the paper: 
first, that there has recently been either underfiring or overhiring in Germany, 
and second, that during the boom there was underhiring. The paper linked the 
two causally: yesterday’s underhiring caused today’s overhiring. Wolfers 
therefore wondered whether the same phenomenon had been witnessed 
in previous episodes: had there been underhiring during an earlier boom 
followed by overhiring in the subsequent recession?
Kristin Forbes suggested that there were some key similarities between 
Japan and Germany that mattered for the paper’s topic. Japan, too, had had 
slow growth for a number of years before the crisis, and its very strong 
manufacturing  sector  relied  heavily,  like  Germany’s,  on  exports.  Then, 
during the crisis, unemployment in Japan was surprisingly stable, as it was 
in Germany. There were  important  institutional  differences  between  the 
two countries, but nevertheless Forbes wondered whether some of the other 
parts of the story for Germany might also apply to Japan.
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Gerald Cohen found it remarkable that there had recently been a decline 
in the German unemployment rate of more than 1 percentage point from 
the previous cyclical low despite the fact that GDP was still below its peak. 
He thought that was the most interesting puzzle presented by the German 
experience in the recession.
Robert Gordon offered that the key issue was whether the decline in pro-
ductivity in Germany in the last two years was simply offsetting unusually 
high productivity in the previous five years. Figure 6 in the paper suggested 
that this might be the case: too much employment after 2008 and too little 
employment before. He  thought  it would be helpful  to use  a  symmetric 
productivity equation to predict productivity by a time series arrangement 
with lags. On Hall’s question of how Germany produced extra output with 
no extra employees, Gordon proposed that the answer was largely variation 
in capital utilization. There was an additional, unmeasured factor input, 
namely, running the machines faster or longer, that allowed extra output to 
be produced with an unchanged number of workers.
